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ERIE STEP ZERO 
Alexander A. Reinert* 
 
Courts and commentators have assumed that the Erie doctrine, while 
originating in diversity cases, applies in all cases whatever the basis for 
federal jurisdiction.  Thus, when a federal court asserts jurisdiction over 
pendent state law claims through the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction in 
a federal question case, courts regularly apply the Erie doctrine to resolve 
conflict between federal and state law.  This Article shows why this common 
wisdom is wrong. 
To understand why, it is necessary to return to Erie’s goals, elaborated 
over time by the U.S. Supreme Court.  Erie and its progeny are steeped in 
diversity-driven policy concerns:  concerns about unequal treatment based 
on state citizenship and forum shopping figure most prominently.  The first 
concern, while salient in any diversity of citizenship case, simply has no 
application in cases in which subject matter jurisdiction is founded upon 
“arising under” jurisdiction.  And the second Erie-derived principle, 
avoiding forum shopping, while relevant to federal question cases, has a 
different federalism timbre in diversity cases.  In diversity cases, forum 
shopping for certain substantive rules may deprive state courts of the 
opportunity to adjudicate claims that involve state law through and through.  
In jurisdiction founded on a federal question, by contrast, litigants are 
encouraged to resort to the uniformity, experience, and solicitude of federal 
courts; certain kinds of forum shopping are overtly welcomed, if not 
encouraged.  Thus, this Article shows that Erie applies, but differently, in 
cases founded on federal question jurisdiction.  In so doing, it provides a new 
framework—what I call, borrowing from administrative law scholarship, 
“Erie Step Zero”—for considering Erie questions in their proper 
jurisdictional context, ensuring that federal law is not unnecessarily 
displaced by a reflexive application of Erie in any case in which a state law 
claim is presented.  
 
*  Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law.  I am grateful to Richard 
Bierschbach, Helen Hershkoff, Margaret Lemos, Max Minzner, and Kevin Stack for their 
comments on this Article.  In addition, I received very useful feedback from participants in 
the First Annual Civil Procedure Workshop, in particular Stephen Burbank, Brooke Coleman, 
Allan Erbsen, and Judith Resnik. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The doctrine introduced by Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins1 requires 
federal courts sitting in diversity jurisdiction to apply state substantive law to 
resolve state law claims.2  Almost all scholars and jurists also maintain, 
however, that Erie applies when federal courts sit in federal question—or 
“arising under”—jurisdiction.3  This is not surprising, nor is it wrong at a 
broad level—Erie itself said that “[e]xcept in matters governed by the Federal 
Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the 
law of the State.”4  Yet neither scholars nor federal judges have taken the 
time to explain the precise role of Erie or the Rules of Decision Act (RDA) 
in diversity cases.  Most simply assume that Erie applies to RDA problems 
with the same force regardless of the jurisdictional basis.  This Article offers 
reasons to question that assumption and also is the first to provide a 
framework placing Erie in its jurisdictional context. 
The failure to engage with this question is quite understandable.  For 
although it is assumed that Erie applies in federal question cases, every Erie 
case decided by the U.S. Supreme Court has arisen through diversity 
jurisdiction.5  Lower federal courts therefore have not had the benefit of the 
 
 1. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 2. Id. at 79–80. 
 3. One notable exception will be discussed below. See infra Part I.A. See generally Peter 
Westen & Jeffrey S. Lehman, Is There Life for Erie After the Death of Diversity?, 78 MICH. 
L. REV. 311 (1980) (arguing that the Erie doctrine should apply differently in federal question 
and supplemental jurisdiction claims). 
 4. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78 (emphasis added). 
 5. See infra note 50 and accompanying text.  To be clear, by “Erie case” I mean every 
case in which the Court relied upon the Erie doctrine to resolve a choice-of-law question.  In 
some federal question cases, the Court has explicitly declined to apply the Erie analysis. See 
infra notes 68–92 and accompanying text. 
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Court’s insight when reviewing the numerous cases in which Erie and RDA 
questions arise in the federal question context.  In the Court’s absence, 
however, lower courts unfortunately have failed to fill the void with any 
framework for deciding this question. 
Despite the collective unwillingness to address this question in more detail, 
it is an important one that can arise in numerous contexts outside of what we 
might call a “true” Erie dilemma—where conflict between state and federal 
law arises in cases in which the sole basis for jurisdiction is diversity of 
citizenship.  First, and certainly most common, are those cases in which state 
law claims are raised because they share a “common nucleus of operative 
fact”6 with a claim over which there is an independent basis for arising under 
jurisdiction.7  For the most part, courts have assumed that Erie applies 
without any modification to these pendent state law claims.  The second 
category of cases are undoubtedly much smaller and involve claims created 
by state law but implicating an essential and substantial question of federal 
law that is sufficient to create a basis for federal question jurisdiction.8  
Courts have given almost no thought to how Erie applies in these cases. 
In this Article, I provide a framework for approaching all of these difficult 
Erie questions.  The first step is recognizing that the questions we should ask 
may depend on the jurisdictional context in which the case arises.  For 
instance, in diversity cases, we will usually at some point consider whether 
the choice between state and federal law is outcome determinative in light of 
“the twin aims of the Erie rule.”9  These twin aims—avoiding forum 
shopping and inequitable administration of laws based on the citizenship of 
the parties—have particular resonance in diversity of citizenship jurisdiction.  
But they do not necessarily translate well to cases in which federal question 
jurisdiction provides the jurisdictional hook.  On the other hand, Hanna v. 
Plumer’s10 insistence that we think of outcome determinativeness from an ex 
ante rather than ex post perspective11 is sensible regardless of the 
jurisdictional context. 
Taking these two insights together, therefore, my proposed framework 
asks about forum shopping and inequity from an ex ante perspective but 
 
 6. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966). 
 7. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2012); Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715.  These state law claims share a 
common nucleus with a parallel federal law claim asserted in the plaintiff’s complaint or may 
enter a federal question case as compulsory or permissive counterclaims raised by the 
defendant. See, e.g., Michelle S. Simon, Defining the Limits of Supplemental Jurisdiction 
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367:  A Hearty Welcome to Permissive Counterclaims, 9 LEWIS & CLARK 
L. REV. 295, 303 (2005) (explaining that compulsory counterclaims by definition fall within 
Gibbs’s “common nucleus of operative facts” test); see also Global NAPs, Inc. v. Verizon 
New Eng. Inc., 603 F.3d 71, 76–77, 88 (1st Cir. 2010) (concluding that § 1367(a)’s language 
is broader than the “transaction or occurrence” language in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
13(a)). 
 8. See generally Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059 (2013); Empire Healthchoice 
Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677 (2006); Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue 
Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308 (2005). 
 9. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468–69 (1965). 
 10. 380 U.S. 460 (1965). 
 11. See id. at 468–69. 
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recognizes that arising under jurisdiction serves different purposes than 
diversity jurisdiction.  Whereas diversity jurisdiction makes federal courts 
available to resolve state law claims in a forum free from bias based on state 
citizenship, arising under jurisdiction makes federal courts available to 
resolve federal law issues because federal judges might be more experienced, 
solicitous, and knowledgeable about federal law and because it serves the 
federal system’s interest in the uniform application of federal law.12  When 
state law questions arise in federal question cases, they are almost always 
intimately connected to the federal issues:  perhaps they arise through a state 
law claim that is part of the federal question claim’s “common nucleus of 
operative fact,”13 perhaps they arise through a state law claim that contains 
an embedded and significant federal issue,14 or perhaps it is necessary to 
resolve state law issues to resolve a federally created legal claim.15  In all of 
these cases, concerns about forum shopping should be focused on those cases 
in which the choice of a federal forum is motivated by something other than 
the recognized and beneficial reasons for which we make federal courts 
available to resolve federal law.  Similarly, concerns about inequity should 
not be focused on citizenship but on the differences in treatment between 
state law claimants who do or do not have access to federal courts.  Finally, 
to the extent Hanna suggested that the balancing of interests introduced by 
Byrd v. Blue Ridge Cooperative16 was unnecessary or unimportant, 
examining Erie in the context of federal question jurisdiction should bring 
that balancing back to the fore. 
Of course, this issue will be most salient when the choice of law at stake 
involves an issue that applies throughout the case, as opposed to an issue that 
is claim specific, or when applying state law will effectively interfere with an 
important federal interest.  Often, where a rule of decision as to a legal issue 
can be applied to one claim without interfering with the adjudication of 
another claim, state law can be applied to state claims and federal law to 
federal claims.  But where a legal issue cuts across claims either directly or 
indirectly, there will be more compelling reasons to apply federal rather than 
state law.  My proposed framework will be most useful in both framing and 
resolving the conflicts present in each of these situations. 
What I suggest here is a different take on a problem that Peter Westen and 
Jeffrey Lehman addressed more than thirty years ago.17  Westen and Lehman, 
 
 12. See Grable, 545 U.S. at 312 (“The doctrine captures the commonsense notion that a 
federal court ought to be able to hear claims recognized under state law that nonetheless turn 
on substantial questions of federal law, and thus justify resort to the experience, solicitude, 
and hope of uniformity that a federal forum offers on federal issues.”). 
 13. See, e.g., United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966). 
 14. See, e.g., Grable, 545 U.S. at 313. 
 15. See Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95, 100 (1938) (making an 
independent determination of state law in a case founded on the Contract Clause, and not 
deferring wholesale to the decision of the state’s highest court, “in order that the constitutional 
mandate may not become a dead letter”). 
 16. 356 U.S. 525 (1958). 
 17. See generally Westen & Lehman, supra note 3.  Since Westen and Lehman’s article, 
however, no one has attempted to systematically analyze the potentially different role that Erie 
might play in federal question cases.  And as I discuss in more detail below, Westen and 
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however, were concerned with assessing the validity of federal common law 
rules that might govern federal question disputes, not with the choice between 
federal and state law, because of their view that the Supremacy Clause 
required application of any valid federal rule, whether sourced from judge-
made law or elsewhere.18  And when Westen and Lehman addressed the 
question of supplemental jurisdiction, they only discussed ancillary claims 
and focused on differing federal and state law rules that could be applied to 
each claim in a case in isolation.19  As I discuss in detail below, the problem 
is far more difficult when application of a state law rule cannot be confined 
solely to the state law claim, either directly or indirectly. 
In Part I of this Article, I lay out the treatment of this topic to date, from 
both a scholarly and jurisprudential perspective.  The orthodox view, rarely 
challenged on its face, is that Erie applies in exactly the same way in federal 
question cases as it does in diversity cases.  As I show in Part II, the basis for 
this position is questionable:  scholars and courts cite to many of the same 
sources, but a close consideration of them leads, at best, to ambiguity.  In Part 
III, I return to Erie and its progeny to show that many of the concerns driving 
Erie were rooted in the specific context of diversity jurisdiction.  Some of 
these concerns have broad application in the federal question context, but the 
specifics might look different.  In Part IV, I propose a framework that 
contextualizes the Erie analysis with respect to the different goals of diversity 
and federal question jurisdiction.  Critical to this framework is recognizing 
that the first question in resolving a choice-of-law dispute between federal 
and state law is what I call “Erie Step Zero”—one must situate the dispute in 
its jurisdictional context before moving to the more familiar Erie choice of 
law analysis.  Just as in administrative law, where Chevron Step Zero 
emerged to assist courts in determining whether the traditional Chevron 
analysis applies at all to agency interpretations of governing statutes,20 Erie 
Step Zero offers a methodology for courts to determine whether 
straightforward Erie analysis should apply to particular choice-of-law 
questions.  After introducing the Step Zero concept, I then demonstrate some 
areas of law in which this framework might prove particularly useful. 
 
Lehman’s article does not sufficiently attend to the many complexities present in supplemental 
jurisdiction cases and cases in which original jurisdiction is exercised through § 1331 over a 
fundamentally state law claim. See infra notes 43–49 and accompanying text. 
 18. See Westen & Lehman, supra note 3, at 314. 
 19. See id. at 386 n.218. 
 20. The “Step Zero” moniker originated in a 2001 law review article. See Thomas W. 
Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 836 (2001).  It 
subsequently was the subject of a close study and critique by Cass Sunstein. See Cass R. 
Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187 (2006).  It continues to occupy the time and 
attention of administrative law scholars and judges, even though the Supreme Court has never 
used the term. See Michael Herz, Chevron Is Dead; Long Live Chevron, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 
1867, 1906 (2015). 
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I.  THE ROLE OF ERIE IN NONDIVERSITY CASES 
THROUGH THE LENS OF COMMENTATORS AND COURTS 
In this part, I survey the scholarly and judicial approach to Erie’s 
application outside of the diversity of citizenship context.  Part I.A shows that 
academics and commentators have almost uniformly stated that Erie doctrine 
applies in the same way to all state law claims in federal court, whatever the 
basis for federal court jurisdiction.  Judicial decisions, reviewed in Part I.B, 
are generally consistent with the academic consensus, at least on its face.  In 
application, however, I show that some courts have questioned the 
orthodoxy, although none has provided a coherent framework for applying 
Erie to nondiversity state law claims. 
A.  Survey of Scholarly Commentary 
It is now almost universally assumed, within both the academy and the 
judiciary, that the Erie doctrine applies to all state law claims, regardless of 
whether the basis for jurisdiction in federal court is founded on diversity or 
federal question.21  Judge Henry Friendly described the view that Erie 
applied only to diversity cases as an “oft-encountered heresy,”22 although he 
acknowledged that the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, at least as of 1964, 
had contributed to the blasphemy.23  The Wright and Miller treatise 
succinctly states that the view that Erie applies only to diversity cases “is 
simply wrong.”24  The logic behind this proposition has appeal.  As Adam 
Steinman has noted, to the extent that one believes Erie addressed a 
constitutional problem—federal courts’ power to declare substantive law—
its logic is not limited to diversity cases, and neither the RDA nor the Rules 
Enabling Act (REA) makes a distinction between jurisdictional bases.25 
Thus, many commentators assert that Erie applies to all state law claims 
presented to a federal court, whether through diversity jurisdiction or 
 
 21. See, e.g., Sergio J. Campos, Erie as a Choice of Enforcement Defaults, 64 FLA. L. REV. 
1573, 1586 n.73 (2012); Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation:  Methodology 
as “Law” and the Erie Doctrine, 120 YALE L.J. 1898, 1926 (2011) (“It is important to 
remember that the Erie doctrine applies in federal-question and federal constitutional cases, 
just as it does in diversity cases, provided that an analytically separate question of state law is 
presented.”); Geri J. Yonover, Ascertaining State Law:  The Continuing Erie Dilemma, 38 
DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 22 (1988) (“It is also clear that Erie’s mandate impinges in areas of pendent 
and federal question, as well as diversity, jurisdiction.”). 
 22. See Henry Friendly, In Praise of Erie—And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 408 n.122 (1964) (stating that the idea that “the Erie decision was limited 
to diversity cases” is an “oft-encountered heresy” and that “[t]he correct view” is that “the Erie 
doctrine applies, whatever the ground for federal jurisdiction, to any issue or claim which has 
its source in state law”). 
 23. See id. 
 24. 19 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4520 (3d ed. 2016) (“It frequently is said that the doctrine of Erie 
Railroad Company v. Tompkins applies only in diversity of citizenship cases; this statement 
simply is wrong.” (footnote omitted)). 
 25. See Adam N. Steinman, What Is the Erie Doctrine?:  (And What Does It Mean for the 
Contemporary Politics of Judicial Federalism?), 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 245, 311–12 
(2008). 
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supplemental state law claims in federal question cases.26  Moreover, many 
others assume that Erie also applies to all state law issues presented in cases 
triggering federal question jurisdiction, whether those issues arise through 
supplemental claims, state law claims implicating a substantial federal issue, 
or federally created claims in which a state law issue arises on the 
periphery.27  In the words of an oft-cited Second Circuit case, under Erie it 
 
 26. Joseph P. Bauer, Shedding Light on Shady Grove:  Further Reflections on the Erie 
Doctrine from a Conflicts Perspective, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 939, 985 n.2 (2011) (noting 
that Erie applied in diversity cases, supplemental jurisdiction cases, and when there are state-
law-created counterclaims, cross-claims, or impleaders); Donald Earl Childress III, When Erie 
Goes International, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1531, 1545 n.96 (2011) (“For purposes of 
completeness, I note that the Erie and Klaxon rules also apply to state-law claims heard in a 
federal question case through the exercise of pendent or supplemental jurisdiction.”); Donald 
L. Doernberg, The Unseen Track of Erie Railroad:  Why History and Jurisprudence Suggest a 
More Straightforward Form of Erie Analysis, 109 W. VA. L. REV. 611, 618 n.33 (2007) (“[I]t 
is clear that today RDA is viewed as a choice-of-law statute for diversity cases and when state 
law otherwise governs of its own force, as when supplemental jurisdiction brings state law 
claims before a federal court in a federal-question case.” (citation omitted)); JoEllen Lind, The 
End of Trial on Damages?:  Intangible Losses and Comparability Review, 51 BUFF. L. REV. 
251, 285–86 (2003) (stating that Erie applies in federal question cases if the source of law is 
state law and application does not undermine federal policies). 
 27. Roy L. Brooks & Sharon A. Cheever, The Federal Loan Guarantee Program:  A 
Unified Approach, 10 J. CORP. L. 185, 221–22, 228 n.312 (1984) (noting that Erie applies to 
nonfederal issues arising in federal question cases); see also 13D CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET 
AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3567.1 (3d ed. Supp. 2016) (“Supplemental claims 
are governed by state substantive law.”); Campos, supra note 21, at 1632 n.73 (stating that 
Erie applies to state law questions in federal question cases); Daniel C.K. Chow, Limiting Erie 
in a New Age of International Law:  Toward a Federal Common Law of International Choice 
of Law, 74 IOWA L. REV. 165, 167 n.4 (1988) (noting that Erie applies to any issue of state law 
that has not been expressly or impliedly displaced by federal substantive law); Michael C. 
Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 235, 284 & nn.221–
22 (1994) (stating that federal courts follow state law in diversity cases, supplemental claims 
in federal question cases, and cases such as due process cases in which the court must first 
resolve an issue of state law); Martha A. Field, Sources of Law:  The Scope of Federal 
Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 881, 912 n.141 (1986) (noting that Erie applies to diversity 
cases and state law issues in federal question cases); Gluck, supra note 21, at 1926 (“In other 
words, if one agrees that, in the straight diversity case, state methodology should be used to 
interpret state statutes, then once we distill the fact that many nondiversity cases present 
essentially identical questions of state statutory interpretation, Erie makes clear that the same 
approach should apply.”); Abbe R. Gluck, The Federal Common Law of Statutory 
Interpretation:  Erie for the Age of Statutes, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 753, 785 n.122 (2013) 
[hereinafter Gluck, The Federal Common Law of Statutory Interpretation] (“The Erie doctrine 
applies in federal question and federal constitutional cases, just as it does in diversity cases, 
provided that an analytically separate question of state law is presented.”); Alfred Hill, State 
Procedural Law in Federal Nondiversity Litigation, 69 HARV. L. REV. 66, 70–71 (1955) (“This 
aspect of Erie is clearly applicable in the federal courts today whether jurisdiction rests on 
diversity of citizenship, on the presence of a federal question, or on some other nondiversity 
ground.”); John Martinez, Taking Time Seriously:  The Federal Constitutional Right to Be 
Free from “Startling” State Court Overrulings, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 297, 319 n.95 
(1988) (stating that Erie’s application depends on the source of the right sued upon, not upon 
the basis for jurisdiction); Calvin R. Massey, State Sovereignty and the Tenth and Eleventh 
Amendments, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 61, 78 (1989) (“Even in federal question cases involving state 
law issues, Erie commands that state decisional law be observed.”); Richard A. Matasar, 
Rediscovering “One Constitutional Case”:  Procedural Rules and the Rejection of the Gibbs 
Test for Supplemental Jurisdiction, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 1399, 1489 n.401 (1983) (citing Gibbs 
for the proposition that questions of state law are governed by Erie in federal question cases); 
Adam N. Steinman, Kryptonite for CAFA?, 32 REV. LITIG. 649, 684 n.186 (2013) (“Erie and 
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is the “source of the right sued upon,” not the basis for jurisdiction, that 
determines which law to apply.28 
This consensus, however, neglects the critical question of how Erie applies 
outside of diversity.  To say that Erie applies in federal question cases does 
not necessarily foreclose the possibility that Erie could apply differently in 
different jurisdictional contexts.  In the two decades after Erie was 
announced, in fact, many commentators assumed that its role in federal 
question cases was limited, although they did not explore the depths of its 
role in supplemental jurisdiction claims.  For instance, Sergei Zlinkoff, 
writing four years after the decision, noted that the underlying policy of 
Erie—avoiding discrimination on the basis of citizenship—did not apply in 
federal question cases and carried this principle over to supplemental 
jurisdiction because of the concern that applying multiple sources of law to a 
single lawsuit would create needless complexity.29  Six years later, James A. 
Gorrell and Ithamar D. Weed found it unsurprising that Erie had been mostly 
ignored in federal question cases because they could not present problems of 
a type similar to Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow 
Taxicab & Transfer Co.30 and other cases that Erie targeted.31  Like Zlinkoff, 
Gorrell and Weed recognized the problem of deciding what law to apply in 
supplemental jurisdiction cases but assumed that state law should apply to be 
consistent with Erie.32  Along the same lines, Henry Hart read the Erie 
 
the REA are not categorically limited to diversity cases and can apply in federal question cases 
as well.”); Steinman, supra note 25, at 311–12 (criticizing the “oft-stated assumption” that 
Erie applies only in diversity cases); Arthur D. Wolf, Preliminary Injunction Standards in 
Massachusetts State and Federal Courts, 35 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 1, 41 (2013) (“State 
substantive law claims, governed by the Erie doctrine, may arise in a federal court in at least 
three types of cases or controversies:  (1) where a state claim is asserted based on diversity 
jurisdiction; (2) where a state claim is asserted based on supplemental jurisdiction; and (3) 
where a state claim contains an essential federal element within general federal question 
jurisdiction.”); Geri J. Yonover, A Kinder, Gentler Erie:  Reining in the Use of Certification, 
47 ARK. L. REV. 305, 310–14, 310 n.22 (1994) (stating that Erie applies to diversity cases and 
state law claims brought pursuant to supplemental jurisdiction, in addition to state law 
questions “incidental to resolution of the federal question presented”). 
 28. Maternally Yours v. Your Maternity Shop, 234 F.2d 538, 540 n.1 (2d Cir. 1956); 
Harold L. Korn, Professor, N.Y.U. Sch. of Law, Remarks on the Continuing Effect of State 
Rules of Evidence in the Federal Courts (June 21, 1969), in A Discussion of the Proposed 
Federal Rules of Evidence Before the Annual Judicial Conference Second Judicial Circuit of 
the United States, 48 F.R.D. 39, 69 (1969) (“[A]pplication of the Erie doctrine depends on the 
source or nature of the right being asserted, rather than on the basis of the federal court’s 
jurisdiction, so that although its usual application is in diversity cases, it is neither applicable 
to all such cases nor limited to them.”). 
 29. See Sergei S. Zlinkoff, Erie v. Tompkins:  In Relation to the Law of Trade-Marks and 
Unfair Competition, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 955, 987–88 (1942) (“The application of different 
sources of governing law to various issues in the same lawsuit will create endless 
complications and result in fine-spun distinctions that will make those generated by Swift v. 
Tyson look like child’s play.”); id. at 989 (arguing that “all issues over which federal 
jurisdiction is sustainable, other than upon the basis of diversity, be governed by federal law, 
regardless of whether or not diversity is also present in the particular case”). 
 30. 276 U.S. 518 (1928). 
 31. See James A. Gorrell & Ithamar D. Weed, Erie Railroad:  Ten Years After, 9 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 276, 300–01 (1948). 
 32. See id. at 302–04. 
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Court’s concern with forum shopping to be limited to diversity cases.33  
Others also acknowledged, even if they did not agree, that Erie’s role outside 
of diversity cases was at least up for grabs.34 
More recent scholarship also considers the possibility that the Erie analysis 
could be more complex in federal question cases.  Allan Erbsen, for instance, 
has suggested that the difference between interests in state law claims arising 
in diversity and state law claims arriving through supplemental jurisdiction 
might merit different interpretive methods:  forum shopping may be less of a 
concern in the latter instance, for example.35  And Erbsen and others have 
recognized that federalism concerns may play out differently in the two 
categories of cases.36  Some scholars have made a similar argument where 
federal arising under jurisdiction is exclusively vested in federal courts.37 
 
 33. See Henry M. Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 
489, 513 (1954) (noting that forum shopping concerns would evaporate if in-state citizens 
could remove based on diversity jurisdiction). 
 34. See Note, Federal Modification of State Law:  Erie and the Bankruptcy Statute of 
Limitations, 62 YALE L.J. 479, 479–80 (1953) [hereinafter Note, Federal Modification of State 
Law] (observing that there is “no automatic guide” for whether federal courts must absolutely 
adhere to state law in nondiversity cases, using cases under the Bankruptcy Act as an example); 
Note, Rules of Decision in Nondiversity Suits, 69 YALE L.J. 1428, 1434 (1960) (observing that 
in a series of post-Erie cases, the Court seemed to “permit a greater intrusion of federal 
decisional rules in cases involving federal statutes or the United States as a litigant”); Note, 
Toward a Workable Rule of Contribution in the Federal Courts, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 123, 128 
(1965) (observing that on the day Erie was announced, the Court in Hinderlider v. La Plata 
River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938), asserted power to make federal 
substantive law in state law cases filed in state court). 
 35. See Allan Erbsen, Erie’s Four Functions:  Reframing Choice of Law in Federal 
Courts, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 579, 658 n.286 (2013) (stating that federal courts are required 
to apply Erie in federal question cases, but also recognizing that different interests in federal 
question cases might call for a different theoretical approach, which the author describes as “a 
fascinating question that merits further scholarship”); cf. William Baude, Beyond DOMA:  
Choice of State Law in Federal Statutes, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1410–11 (2012) (arguing 
against the extension of the Klaxon doctrine to federal question cases because of the differing 
role of forum shopping concerns). 
 36. See Erbsen, supra note 35, at 658 n.286 (“Moreover, supplemental jurisdiction cases 
might warrant special treatment because federal courts may approach state law differently 
when it is ‘woven into’ a federal question case rather than when it is part of a ‘head of federal 
jurisdiction which entails a responsibility to adjudicate the claim on the basis of state law,’ 
such as the Diversity Clause.” (quoting McNeese v. Bd. of Educ., 373 U.S. 668, 673 & n.5 
(1963))); Gregory Gelfand & Howard B. Abrams, Putting Erie on the Right Track, 49 U. PITT. 
L. REV. 937, 942 n.11 (1988) (distinguishing between “pure” Erie cases and quasi-Erie cases 
in which state law issues are raised through supplemental jurisdiction or because federal law 
incorporates state substantive law, and stating that federalism concerns may differ between the 
two situations, resulting in a different application of the line between substance and 
procedure); cf. Kurt M. Saunders, Plying the Erie Waters:  Choice of Law in the Deterrence 
of Frivolous Appeals, 21 GA. L. REV. 653, 663 n.33 (1987) (“There is sufficient authority to 
support the proposition that the doctrine applies in all actions regardless of the basis of federal 
jurisdiction unless a sufficient federal interest exists to mandate the application of federal 
common law.”). 
 37. See, e.g., Gelfand & Abrams, supra note 36, at 978 n.129 (“In the context of diversity, 
Erie’s forum shopping concern is a reaction to the comparison between a diversity case and 
an identical case in which both litigants happen to be from the same state and a federal court 
is unavailable.  Since the United States is always a party to Federal Tort Claims Act cases, 
there is no comparable state-court-only case by which to measure forum shopping induced 
unfairness.”); Allan R. Stein, Erie and Court Access, 100 YALE L.J. 1935, 1967 n.161 (1991) 
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Other scholars have acknowledged the possibility that jurisdictional 
context matters without taking a final position.38  Abbe Gluck, for example, 
has criticized federal courts for “explicitly disregard[ing] state interpretive 
principles in federal question cases,” even as she acknowledged the 
potential—but minority—view that the Erie question might have different 
application in federal question cases.39  And very few scholars have 
embraced the radical proposition that Erie only applies in the diversity 
context, without much, if any, analysis.40  John Hart Ely, for instance, 
declared that the RDA (and by implication, Erie) “is not applicable in 
 
(arguing that the Erie analysis has little weight in cases in which federal courts have exclusive 
jurisdiction, thereby taking forum shopping and inequitable administration off the table).  
There is, for example, some disagreement about Erie’s application in bankruptcy cases. 
Compare Robert B. Chapman, Bankruptcy, 53 MERCER L. REV. 1199, 1307 n.811 (2002) 
(collecting cases on division in courts between whether to apply federal or state choice-of-law 
rules in bankruptcy cases), and Louis M. Guenin, Choice of Law in Usury, 109 BANKING L.J. 
71, 81–82 (1992) (arguing that analysis is “more complicated” where usury arises in federal 
question cases, particularly bankruptcy), with Alex Mills, Federalism in the European Union 
and the United States:  Subsidiarity, Private Law, and the Conflict of Laws, 32 U. PA. J. INT’L 
L. 369, 418 (2010) (“The principle in Erie was quickly understood to apply not only to 
diversity cases, but also to incidental issues of private law which arise when a federal court 
has taken jurisdiction under other grounds—for example, mandating application of state 
property law to determine proprietary issues which may arise when considering questions of 
federal law, such as bankruptcy.”). 
 38. Martha Dragich, Back to the Drawing Board:  Re-Examining Accepted Premises of 
Regional Circuit Structure, 12 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 201, 226–27 (2011) (“The 
determination as to which cases call for the application of state law is also a matter of debate, 
but may hinge on the particular grant of jurisdiction that allows the case to be heard in federal 
court.”); Note, Federal Modification of State Law, supra note 34, at 484–85 (suggesting that 
policy concerns driving Erie may not be applicable outside diversity context); Note, The Law 
Applied in Diversity Cases:  The Rules of Decision Act and the Erie Doctrine, 85 YALE L.J. 
678, 680 n.6 (1976) (recognizing arguments about the power of federal courts to create 
common law in nondiversity cases, but declining to address the issue in detail). 
 39. See Gluck, The Federal Common Law of Statutory Interpretation, supra note 27, at 
785 n.122 (“Unlike in diversity cases, federal judges do not aim to ‘stand in the shoes’ of state 
judges in federal question cases and that difference could potentially justify federal judges 
approaching state statutory questions in federal question cases from a federal, rather than state, 
interpretive perspective.  But this is not the dominant doctrinal view with respect to other 
questions of state law that arise in federal question cases and so would require an argument 
for why statutory interpretation methodology should receive special treatment.”); see also 
Gluck, supra note 21, at 1926. 
 40. See, e.g., Phillip I. Blumberg, The Transformation of Modern Corporation Law:  The 
Law of Corporate Groups, 37 CONN. L. REV. 605, 612 n.27 (2005) (stating that Erie requires 
federal courts to apply state law doctrine on piercing in diversity cases and “single-factor” 
doctrine in federal question cases); Steven S. Gensler, Bifurcation Unbound, 75 WASH. L. REV. 
705, 740 (2000) (arguing that a state court presumption against bifurcation should play a minor 
role in federal court in part because Erie does not apply to federal question cases); Tara L. 
Haluch, Treatment of Americans with Disabilities Act Claims When the Plaintiff Is Deceased:  
A Call for Uniformity, 48 EMORY L.J. 733, 760 n.187 (1999) (assuming that the procedural-
substantive distinction did not apply to Americans with Disabilities Act cases because they 
are federal question cases); Korn, supra note 28, at 74–77 (arguing that state law privileges 
should be recognized in diversity cases but not federal question cases); Peter L. Strauss, On 
Resegregating the Worlds of Statute and Common Law, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 429, 536 (arguing 
that Erie’s prohibition of federal judge-made common law “is an artifact of diversity 
jurisdiction,” which cannot be extended to federal courts sitting in federal question cases 
without achieving “a stunning revision of constitutional understandings”). 
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nondiversity cases.”41  The case that Ely relied upon, however, involved a 
federal question case in which the cause of action was created by federal 
law.42 
Despite the scattered recognition that Erie might apply differently in 
federal question cases, however, Westen and Lehman, writing in 1980, are 
the only scholars to date who have attempted to articulate how Erie might 
function in federal question cases.43  The authors, predicting an end to 
diversity jurisdiction based on then-pending legislation, wrote the article with 
the hope of articulating a function for Erie in federal question and 
supplemental jurisdiction claims, albeit one that was “significantly different” 
from the doctrine’s function in diversity cases.44  The bulk of the article is 
devoted to a reconceptualization of Erie in all types of cases and a general 
defense of a relatively broad role for federal judge-made common law.45  As 
to the specific issue covered here—the role that Erie plays in federal question 
cases—the Westen and Lehman article does not offer much in the way of 
specifics.46  They note, as I do here, that an Erie analysis focused on potential 
discrimination based on citizenship does not resonate well in federal question 
cases, and they suggest at least a general outline of an approach to the 
problem.47  But when they focus on how Erie might work in practice, they 
address only ancillary claims—not supplemental claims generally nor state 
law claims that implicate federal interests that are sufficiently important so 
as to justify the assertion of § 1331 jurisdiction—and they explicitly decline 
to address cases in which one cannot neatly confine choice of law questions 
to each claim in isolation.48  Thus, putting aside the merits of Westen and 
Lehman’s broader claims about the meaning of Erie,49 their article leaves 
much to be desired in terms of the specific question addressed here. 
 
 41. See John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 737 n.226 
(1974). 
 42. See Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 394 (1946) (“The considerations that urge 
adjudication by the same law in all courts within a State when enforcing a right created by that 
State are hardly relevant for determining the rules which bar enforcement of an equitable right 
created not by a State legislature but by Congress.”). 
 43. See generally Westen & Lehman, supra note 3. 
 44. See id. at 312–14. 
 45. See id. at 330–76.  Martin Redish provided a scathing response to these aspects of the 
Westen and Lehman article. See Martin H. Redish, Continuing the Erie Debate:  A Response 
to Westen and Lehman, 78 MICH. L. REV. 959 (1980). 
 46. Redish, supra note 45, at 959 (referring to this portion of Westen and Lehman’s article 
as “almost . . . an afterthought”). 
 47. See Westen & Lehman, supra note 3, at 378–80.  Their approach is based on their 
reconceptualization of Erie as not involving a choice between state and federal law but instead 
simply an assessment of whether there is valid and pertinent federal law on point. See id. at 
314–16.  It is precisely this characterization of Erie that Redish spends considerable time 
criticizing. Redish, supra note 45, at 960–64.  
 48. See Westen & Lehman, supra note 3, at 386–87, 386 n.218. 
 49. Redish is certainly correct for noting that Westen and Lehman’s conception of Erie 
appears to rest on a misreading of Hanna’s modification to Guaranty Trust’s outcome-
determinative test. Compare Redish, supra note 45, at 966–67 (noting that Westen and 
Lehman appear to assume that the outcome-determinative test is simply whether, ex post, a 
choice between state and federal law will result in a different outcome), with Westen & 
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To sum up, with the exceptions noted above, the landscape of Erie 
scholarship tends toward an overriding assumption that (1) Erie applies to all 
state law issues (and some federal issues) arising in federal court regardless 
of the jurisdictional context and (2) Erie looks the same in all contexts.  And 
most importantly, even scholars who question the orthodox view have 
generally failed to address how courts should resolve choice-of-law questions 
in the supplemental jurisdiction context or where state law claims are subject 
to original federal question jurisdiction because they involve an embedded 
substantial federal issue. 
B.  Judicial Application of Erie Outside Diversity Contexts 
The orthodoxy that characterizes Erie scholarship is reflected in the case 
law as well, at least on the surface.  This is striking because Erie’s role in 
federal question cases has only come up in lower federal courts, albeit with 
some frequency.  By contrast, every Supreme Court case to actually apply an 
Erie analysis to a choice-of-law question has been founded on diversity 
jurisdiction.50  Nor has the Court ever directly applied the Erie analysis to 
claims based on supplemental jurisdiction.51  This has not deterred courts 
 
Lehman, supra note 3, at 384 (arguing that “fairness value in diversity is abridged if even a 
single lawsuit comes out differently because of judge-made rules of procedure”). 
 50. Without citing to every case in which the Supreme Court has applied Erie in a diversity 
context, in the 205 Supreme Court cases that have cited to Erie, only one decision appears to 
apply Erie analysis to a state law question arising in a federal question context. See Wichita 
Royalty Co. v. City Nat’l Bank of Wichita Falls, 306 U.S. 103, 107 (1939).  In Wichita Royalty, 
a state law counterclaim was raised in response to a federal claim, and the Court stated, without 
elaboration, that Erie required application of Texas law to the counterclaim. See id.  Since that 
decision, while the Court has discussed Erie in the federal question context, it has yet to apply 
Erie to the choice-of-law analysis in those cases. See, e.g., DelCostello v. Int’l Bhd. of 
Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 159 n.13 (1983) (stating that Erie does not compel federal courts to 
borrow state law to fill in interstitial gaps in federal statutes, but acknowledging that when 
Congress directs courts to borrow from state law, “Erie will ordinarily provide the framework 
for doing so”); Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 476 (1979) (noting that Erie does not control 
in cases premised on a federal cause of action); Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. 
Found., 402 U.S. 313, 324 n.12 (1971) (noting that whether nonmutuality doctrine applied in 
federal question cases was a question of federal law and Erie did not apply); Urie v. Thompson, 
337 U.S. 163, 174 (1949) (finding that the meaning of negligence in an FELA case is a 
question of federal law and not governed by Erie); Vanston Bondholders Protective Comm. 
v. Green, 329 U.S. 156, 162 (1946) (stating that Erie does not apply in bankruptcy cases); 
Clearfield Tr. Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366 (1943) (holding that Erie does not apply 
in state law claims in which the United States is a party); Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 
317 U.S. 173, 176 (1942) (stating that Erie does not apply in a case controlled by federal 
statute); D’Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 455 (1942) (acknowledging but not 
resolving the possibility that the Klaxon-Erie choice-of-law doctrine might not apply in federal 
question cases). But see Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 
164 n.2 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Contrary to the DelCostello Court’s claim, however, 
neither our decision in [Erie] nor the Rules of Decision Act scholarship underlying 
it . . . remotely established that that statute applies only in diversity cases.”); Anderson v. 
Abbott, 321 U.S. 349, 365 (1944) (implying that state law that related to a federal question 
suit would be enforceable pursuant to Erie in the absence of any conflict with federal policy 
announced by Congress). 
 51. The Court has made offhand references to the role of Erie and state law in 
supplemental claims without actually conducting any Erie analysis. See, e.g., Felder v. Casey, 
487 U.S. 131, 151 (1988); United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).  I address 
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from stating with near certainty that “[t]he principles set forth in Erie and its 
progeny apply equally to diversity and federal question cases.”52  Or, put 
differently, “it is not the basis of jurisdiction that requires application of the 
forum state’s choice of law rules, but the source of the claim in question.”53 
On its face, this looks simple.  Many courts assert that state substantive 
law applies in diversity cases and to supplemental state law claims in federal 
question cases54 but that federal law governs adjudication of claims created 
 
in detail below the widespread misinterpretation of the language in Gibbs. See infra notes 138–
41 and accompanying text. 
 52. See, e.g., Park v. City of San Antonio, No. SA-03-CA-0491-RF, 2006 WL 2519503, 
at *14 n.67 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2006); see also Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 
1097, 1102 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Erie applies irrespective of whether the source of subject matter 
jurisdiction is diversity or federal question.”). 
 53. In re Rezulin Prods. Liab. Litig., 210 F.R.D. 61, 69 n.53 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); see, e.g., 
Maternally Yours, Inc. v. Your Maternity Shop, Inc., 234 F.2d 538, 540 n.1 (2d Cir. 1956) 
(“[I]t is the source of the right sued upon, and not the ground on which federal jurisdiction is 
founded, which determines the governing law.”); Monmouth Cty. Corr. Inst. Inmates v. 
Lanzaro, 643 F. Supp. 1217, 1221 (D.N.J. 1986), aff’d in part, modified in part, 834 F.2d 326 
(3d Cir. 1987); Cinnamon v. Abner A. Wolf, Inc., 215 F. Supp. 833, 835–36 (E.D. Mich. 
1963); In re Hilt, 175 B.R. 747, 753 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1994) (relying on the Erie doctrine and 
citing the Wright and Miller treatise). 
 54. Mason & Dixon Intermodal, Inc. v. Lapmaster Int’l LLC, 632 F.3d 1056, 1060 (9th 
Cir. 2011) (“When a district court sits in diversity, or hears state law claims based on 
supplemental jurisdiction, the court applies state substantive law to the state law claims.”); 
Barton v. Clancy, 632 F.3d 9, 17 (1st Cir. 2011) (“A federal court . . . exercising supplemental 
jurisdiction over a state law claim must apply state substantive law.”); Equals Int’l, Ltd. v. 
Scenic Airlines, 35 F. App’x 532, 534 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding that a state law regarding 
attorney’s fees applied to a state law claim supplemental to a federal copyright claim); 
Penobscot Indian Nation v. Key Bank of Me., 112 F.3d 538, 557 n.27 (1st Cir. 1997) (relying 
on Erie to apply state substantive law to pendent state law contract claims in federal question 
cases); Zerman v. Ball, 735 F.2d 15, 19–20 (2d Cir. 1984) (applying, in a securities fraud case, 
state choice-of-law rules to determine the law governing the effect of a choice-of-law clause 
in a securities contract); Rohm & Haas Co. v. Adco Chem. Co., 689 F.2d 424, 429 (3d Cir. 
1982) (requiring a court to look to applicable state choice-of-law principles in a state trade 
secret case brought pendent to a federal patent action); Sys. Operations, Inc. v. Sci. Games 
Dev. Corp., 555 F.2d 1131, 1136 (3d Cir. 1977) (applying Klaxon to pendent jurisdiction 
claims); Spottedcorn v. Advanced Corr. Healthcare, Inc., No. CIV-11-1096-C, 2011 WL 
6100653, at *1 n.2 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 7, 2011) (discussing choice of law issue in terms of a 
requirement of attaching affidavits to complaints); Shannon v. Koehler, No. C 08-4059-MWB, 
2011 WL 10483363 (N.D. Iowa Sept. 16, 2011) (applying federal evidence rules barring the 
admissibility of a settlement offer rather than the state law that would have permitted 
admission in a state law claim supplemental to a federal § 1983 claim); Arvie v. Dodeka, LLC, 
No. H-09-1076, 2011 WL 1750242 (S.D. Tex. May 4, 2011) (involving a potential conflict 
between Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 14 and state law regarding the designation of 
responsible parties in a state law claim supplemental to a federal Fair Debt Collections 
Practices Act claim); Sheasly v. Orr Felt Co., No. CV 10-956-PK, 2010 WL 4273230, at *2 
(D. Or. Oct. 25, 2010) (“Whether Sheasley’s lawsuit is construed as a federal question action 
involving supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim or as a diversity action, this court 
will apply federal procedural law at all times, federal substantive law in analyzing the 
[Employee Retirement Income Security Act] claim, and Oregon substantive law in analyzing 
the perceived-disability claim.”), aff’d, 10-CV-956-PK, 2010 WL 4961807 (D. Or. Dec. 1, 
2010); id. at *3 (noting that state law governed the application of a forum selection clause as 
it related to the state law claims, whether the basis for jurisdiction was diversity or 
supplemental jurisdiction to the federal claim); In re Lease Oil Antitrust Litig. (No. II), No. 
MDL 1206, 2009 WL 5195977, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 22, 2009) (noting that it was commonly, 
but erroneously, assumed that Erie only applied in diversity actions when in fact it applied 
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by the federal sovereign.55  In perhaps the most difficult area, courts have 
rarely addressed the choice-of-law analysis where § 1331 jurisdiction arises 
because a federal question is embedded in a state law claim.56  Other courts 
 
regardless of the basis for subject matter jurisdiction to all issues governed by state law), rev’d 
and vacated sub nom. All Plaintiffs v. All Defendants, 645 F.3d 329 (5th Cir. 2011); Tillman 
v. Georgia, 466 F. Supp. 2d 1311, 1316–17 (S.D. Ga. 2006) (applying state law to determine 
when an action is commenced in a state law claim that was pendent to a federal question 
claim); Fondrk v. Westmoreland County, No. Civ.A 04-0900, 2006 WL 1699471, at *2–3 
(W.D. Pa. June 20, 2006) (applying third-party beneficiary law to a state law claim 
supplemental to a § 1983 claim); Crawford v. Potter, No. Civ. 1:04CV00303, 2005 WL 
2452092, at *3 n.8 (M.D.N.C. Oct. 4, 2005) (applying state law rules of contract interpretation 
to a supplemental claim to Title VII); SEC v. Elmas Trading Corp., 683 F. Supp. 743, 748–49 
(D. Nev. 1987) (relying on Erie to apply state contract law in federal question claim), aff’d, 
865 F.2d 265 (9th Cir. 1988). 
 55. See Corbello v. DeVito, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1136, 1155 (D. Nev. 2012) (making this 
observation in a copyright action), rev’d and remanded, 777 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2015); West 
v. N.M. Taxation & Revenue Dep’t, No. CIV 09-0631 JB/CG, 2011 WL 5223010 (D.N.M. 
Sept. 30, 2011) (“When addressing federal questions, the Court does not have to conduct the 
same analysis that [Erie] requires for diversity cases, to determine whether federal law and 
procedures applies.”); McFadden v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co., No. 2:10-cv-03004 JAM 
KJN PS, 2011 WL 3606797, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2011) (holding that an anti-SLAPP 
motion may be brought to strike state law claims pending in federal court, whether via diversity 
jurisdiction or as claims supplemental to federal question claims but not claims “based on 
federal law”), report and recommendation adopted, No. CIV-S-10-cv-3004-JAM-KJN-PS, 
2011 WL 4765845 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2011); D.V. v. Westmoreland Cty. Children’s Bureau, 
No. 07-829, 2008 WL 612744, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 3, 2008) (“[H]ere the jurisdiction of this 
Court arises under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331, the general federal question statute, obviating the need 
to undertake the Erie choice of law analysis and requiring the application of federal procedural 
and substantive law.”); Brown v. Plainfield Cmty. Consol. Dist. 202, 522 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 
1077 n.4 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (“It hardly bears repeating that the Erie doctrine applies to diversity 
cases, while this case is premised on federal question jurisdiction.”); Atl. Mut. Ins. v. Napa 
Transp., Inc., 399 F. Supp. 2d 523, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (regarding prejudgment interest in 
Carmack Amendment claim), aff’d, 201 F. App’x 19 (2d Cir. 2006); Mobile Gas Serv. Corp. 
v. Utils. Bd. of Daphne, No. Civ.A. 04-0398-P-M, 2005 WL 2428329, at *2 (S.D. Ala. Sept. 
30, 2005) (finding that attorney’s fee claims are governed by federal law in antitrust actions); 
Boonma v. Bredimus, No. Civ.A.3:05-CV-0684-D, 2005 WL 1831967, at *6–8 (N.D. Tex. 
July 29, 2005) (stating that state choice of law rules would apply to state law claims, whether 
brought under diversity or supplemental to federal question cases and that federal choice of 
law rules would apply to federal question claims); cf. Berman v. McManus, No. 2:11-cv-00635 
MCE KJN PS, 2012 WL 1455088, at *2 & n.5 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 2012) (noting that a state 
anti-SLAPP law applies to state law claims brought pursuant to diversity or supplemental to 
federal question claims but not claims based on federal law); Bulletin Displays, LLC v. 
Regency Outdoor Advert., Inc., 448 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1181–82 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (holding 
that, even though California’s anti-SLAPP act was substantive, it did not apply to federal 
question cases because Erie has no application to federal question claims, “only to state law 
claims in diversity actions and pendent state law claims in federal question cases”); Martinez 
v. Humana, Inc., No. Civ.A. C-04-95, 2005 WL 1923532, at *7–8 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 10, 2005) 
(rejecting the “make whole” doctrine for subrogation in federal question ERISA cases, but 
citing the Fifth Circuit case, Sunbeam-Oster Co. Grp. Benefits Plan v. Whitehurst, 102 F.3d 
1368, 1374 (5th Cir. 1996), accepting the possibility that the issue might be different in a 
diversity case); Reed v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 635 F. Supp. 1166, 1167 (N.D. Ill. 1986) 
(applying the federal statute of limitations in a Federal Employers’ Liability Act case and 
describing the contention that Erie applies as borderline frivolous); In re Centerstone 
Diamonds, Inc., No. 2:09-bk-23945-PC, 2014 WL 1330186, at *4–5 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Apr. 
2, 2014) (holding that a state anti-SLAPP law does not apply to federal question cases). 
 56. Amoco Chem. Co. v. Tex Tin Corp., 925 F. Supp. 1192, 1201 n.9 (S.D. Tex. 1996) 
(applying state choice-of-law rules to a state law claim with an embedded federal issue—
assuming that Erie and Klaxon apply); Grynberg Prod. Corp. v. British Gas, PLC, 817 F. Supp. 
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might simply state without elaboration that Erie applies in federal question 
cases without explaining how.57 
But this explanation of the role of Erie in nondiversity cases has actually 
almost never been so simple in application.  First, the Supreme Court itself 
has displaced state law with federal common law even when state sovereignty 
would appear to be at a high point in diversity cases.  In Banco Nacional de 
Cuba v. Sabbatino,58 for example, the Court applied a federal common law 
doctrine to a diversity case, even though it acknowledged that state law likely 
would have resulted in the same outcome.59  The Court felt “constrained to 
make it clear” that, notwithstanding the Erie doctrine, “an issue concerned 
with a basic choice regarding the competence and function of the Judiciary 
and the National Executive in ordering our relationships with other members 
of the international community must be treated exclusively as an aspect of 
federal law.”60  Indeed, the Court suggested that Erie might generally have 
limited application when issues affecting international relations arise in 
diversity cases.61 
Similarly, in Howard v. Lyons,62 a diversity action for defamation, the 
Court applied a federal common law defense because the statements were 
made by an officer of the federal government acting in the course of his 
duties.63  The question implicated the “effective functioning” of the 
government, making it a “peculiarly federal concern” that should not be 
subject to the “vagaries of the laws of the several States.”64  A more recent 
example comes from Boyle v. United Technologies,65 a diversity case in 
which the Court recognized a military contractor defense under federal law 
that would not have been available under the state law that, had Erie applied, 
should have controlled in the case.66  The Court in Boyle found a “‘significant 
conflict’ . . . between an identifiable ‘federal policy or interest and . . . state 
law.’”67 
 
1338, 1361–62 (E.D. Tex. 1993) (holding that Texas pleading law applied to the question of 
what constituted a “well-pleaded complaint”). 
 57. FDIC v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., No. 2:12-CV-4354 MRP (MANx), 2012 WL 
5900973, at *14 n.28 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2012) (citing Steinman, supra note 25, at 311–12 
for the proposition that “some portions of the Erie doctrine likely apply” in federal question 
cases). 
 58. 376 U.S. 398 (1964). 
 59. See id. at 425. 
 60. See id. 
 61. See id.  Sabbatino was overruled by statute. See Westen & Lehman, supra note 3, at 
339–40; see also Foreign Assistance Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 86-633, § 30(d), 78 Stat. 1009, 
1013 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (2012)). 
 62. 360 U.S. 593 (1959). 
 63. See id. at 597 (“We hold that the validity of petitioner’s claim of absolute privilege 
must be judged by federal standards, to be formulated by the courts in the absence of legislative 
action by Congress.”). 
 64. See id. 
 65. 487 U.S. 500 (1988). 
 66. See Doernberg, supra note 26, at 655–56. 
 67. See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 507 (quoting Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 
68 (1966)). 
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Outside of the diversity context, in federal question cases, the Supreme 
Court has also found Erie inapplicable and federal common law controlling.  
The same day that Erie was decided, for example, the Supreme Court 
recognized its power to make federal common law in a state law dispute 
between two Colorado private parties because the case concerned 
interpretation of an interstate water compact.68  Similarly, in Clearfield Trust 
Co. v. United States,69 the Court had to determine whether state law should 
govern commercial paper obligations for a check drawn on the Treasurer of 
the United States through the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.  Because 
of the concern for uniformity in defining the rights and obligations flowing 
from a check backed by the federal fisc, the Court held that Erie did not apply 
and that it was free to apply federal common law to the dispute.70 
Cases like Clearfield Trust can be understood as providing an exception to 
the general Erie rule when a “distinct federal interest” is at stake.71  And in 
the decade or so after Erie, these cases were relatively common.72  In 
D’Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC,73 the Court declined to decide whether the 
rule of Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co.74—an extension of 
the Erie doctrine—applied where jurisdiction is not based on diversity of 
citizenship, instead holding that federal law controlled the question of 
liability because of the federal policy to protect a federal corporation from 
certain misrepresentations.75  In his concurrence, Justice Robert Jackson 
strived to provide a more detailed explanation of the Court’s reasoning.76  He 
took the position that Klaxon did not control, because (1) the case was not 
founded on diversity jurisdiction, (2) Congress did not direct the Court to 
look to state law to answer this question, and (3) application of federal 
common law is always necessary to “implement[] the federal Constitution 
and statutes.”77  Neither the majority opinion nor any of the concurrences 
argued that federal statutes explicitly required application of the rule adopted 
 
 68. See Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 101, 110 
(1938). 
 69. 318 U.S. 363 (1943). 
 70. See id. at 366–67. 
 71. See Doernberg, supra note 26, at 648–50 (discussing Clearfield Trust in detail). 
 72. Four years after Erie, the Court stated that Erie does not control a federal question 
case and that state law must “yield” when it clashes with federal law and policy. See Sola Elec. 
Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173, 176 (1942); see also Deitrick v. Greaney, 309 U.S. 
190, 200–01 (1940) (holding that where a lawsuit is based on federal law, Erie has no 
application because “[t]he extent and nature of the legal consequences of this condemnation, 
though left by the statute to judicial determination, are nevertheless to be derived from it and 
the federal policy which it has adopted”).  Ten years after Erie, scholars could observe that the 
Clearfield Trust line of cases could be interpreted as indicating that Erie is limited to diversity 
cases, even if the Court had not justified them explicitly on those grounds. See, e.g., Gorrell 
& Weed, supra note 31, at 295. 
 73. 315 U.S. 447 (1942). 
 74. 313 U.S. 487 (1941). 
 75. See D’Oench, Duhme & Co. at 456–59. 
 76. See id. at 465 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“I think we should attempt a more explicit 
answer to the question whether federal or state law governs our decision in this sort of case 
than is found either in the opinion of the Court or in the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice 
Frankfurter.”). 
 77. See id. at 470–72. 
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by the Court—Justice Jackson rested his views on the “policy” behind the act 
creating the FDIC.78 
Following the lead of Clearfield Trust, in case after case, the Court has 
declined to rely upon Erie in federal question cases that involve state law 
issues, whether in tort cases,79 corporate law,80 calculation of damages,81 or 
for statute of limitations questions,82 to give just a few examples.  The 
explanations that the Court has relied upon for applying federal common law 
in all of these cases, regardless of their jurisdictional basis, revolve around a 
conclusion that the issues involved are “matters essentially of federal 
character” rather than the issues of local interest protected by Erie83—that 
application of state law will undermine interests in uniformity84 or the federal 
fisc.85  At times, the Court explicitly has stated that Erie does not apply in 
federal question cases, at least where there are no state law claims asserted 
through supplemental jurisdiction.86  The logic of Clearfield Trust does not 
apply in every case that implicates federal interests, but these cases help 
frame the relevant considerations.  In Miree v. DeKalb County,87 for 
example, the plaintiff brought a diversity case regarding an aircraft crash.  
Although the Court recognized a general federal interest in the regulation of 
air travel, and although the United States was a party to the contract at issue 
in the case (but not a party to the case), the Court found that state law 
governed the question of whether the defendants were liable on a third-party 
beneficiary theory under the contract.88  Key to the resolution of Miree was 
 
 78. See id. at 473–75. 
 79. See United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 305 (1947) (applying federal 
common law because the case involved government-soldier relations).  The Court of Appeals 
had applied state law, relying on the Erie doctrine, id. at 303 n.4, but the Court, extending the 
logic of Clearfield Trust, held that where a case involved the “duties imposed upon the United 
States and the rights acquired by it,” federal law should govern, id. at 305. 
 80. See Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 476 (1979) (holding that Erie does not apply to 
resolve questions of the power of disinterested directors to terminate a derivative suit because 
“we proceed on the premise of the existence of a federal cause of action”). 
 81. See Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490, 493 (1980) (holding that federal 
common law governs assessment of damages in Federal Employers’ Liability Act cases). 
 82. See Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395 (1946).  The Holmberg Court 
distinguished Guaranty Trust as a case involving the “duty of a federal court, sitting as it were 
as a court of a State, to approximate as closely as may be State law in order to vindicate without 
discrimination a right derived solely from a State,” rather than a federal court tasked with 
enforcing an equitable right created by Congress. Id. 
 83. See Boyle v. United Techs., 487 U.S. 500, 511–12 (1988); Burks, 441 U.S. at 477 
(using federal common law because rules “impact significantly upon the effectuation of 
federal rights”); Howard v. Lyons, 360 U.S. 593, 597 (1959); Standard Oil, 332 U.S. at 307. 
 84. See Standard Oil, 332 U.S. at 309–10; Holmberg, 327 U.S. at 395. 
 85. See Standard Oil, 332 U.S. at 310–11; Clearfield Tr. Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 
363, 366–67 (1943). 
 86. Burks, 441 U.S. at 476 (“Since we proceed on the premise of the existence of a federal 
cause of action, it is clear that ‘our decision is not controlled by [Erie],’ and state law does not 
operate of its own force.” (quoting Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173, 176 
(1942))). 
 87. 433 U.S. 25 (1977). 
 88. See id. at 29 (“While federal common law may govern even in diversity cases where 
a uniform national rule is necessary to further the interests of the Federal Government . . . the 
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the Court’s conclusion that it would have no “direct” impact on the United 
States or the federal fisc.89  United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc.90 is another 
more recent example of a case in which federal law was found to govern the 
creation of substantive law but in which the Court found that absent 
congressional lawmaking, the best course was to adopt state law as a default 
rule.91  The Court arrived at its decision after determining that there was no 
demonstrated need for national uniformity, that application of state law 
would not “frustrate . . . federal interests,” and that disregarding state law 
would unseat settled expectations.92 
One could read all of these cases as interpretations of the RDA’s language 
directing the application of state law rules of decision “in cases where they 
apply” but not “where the Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts 
of Congress otherwise require or provide.”93  And scholars have recognized 
that in some cases, the Supreme Court has implied that the RDA has no 
relevance to federal question cases.94  But when doing so, the Court has not 
explicitly addressed the question of whether it is applying the RDA but 
finding that federal statute controls or whether it is just ignoring the RDA 
because application of state law would undermine enforcement of a federal 
right.95  As Henry M. Hart once observed, distinguishing among these 
options is difficult because the RDA “seems almost perversely 
uninformative.”96  In any event, however one views the role of the RDA (and 
I will say more about this later), the Supreme Court has regularly found that 
Erie’s principles either do not apply or are limited in federal question cases 
and other cases in which federal interests are at stake.  But the Court has 
never actually conducted an Erie analysis for state law claims that themselves 
are the basis of § 1331 jurisdiction or that are brought as supplemental claims 
to an original federal question claim. 
Lower courts have demonstrated a similar tendency to resolve choice of 
law questions in tension with the orthodox statement that Erie applies equally 
in federal question cases.  For instance, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities 
Act provides federal jurisdiction over state law claims when those claims are 
asserted against foreign powers.  On the simple rule enunciated above, Erie 
should call for the application of state substantive law to resolve those claims, 
but courts considering the question often turn first to federal common law to 
 
application of federal common law to resolve the issue presented here would promote no 
federal interests even approaching the magnitude of those found in Clearfield Trust.”). 
 89. See id. 
 90. 440 U.S. 715 (1979). 
 91. See id. at 740. 
 92. See id. at 728–29, 734, 739–40; De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 580–81 (1956) 
(looking to state law for the definition of the word “children” as used in Copyright Act because 
the law of domestic relations is an area of traditional state regulation); Joshua M. Koppel, 
Federal Common Law and the Courts’ Regulation of Pre-Litigation Preservation, 1 STAN. J. 
COMPLEX LITIG. 171, 189–90 (2012). 
 93. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2012). 
 94. John T. Cross, State Choice of Law Rules in Bankruptcy, 42 OKLA. L. REV. 531, 553–
55 (1989). 
 95. See id. at 553–54. 
 96. See Hart, supra note 33, at 504. 
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determine which substantive law governs.97  And, just as in Erie scholarship, 
some courts have carved out certain areas—for example, bankruptcy and 
choice of law in transfers—in which the simple rule applying Erie to all 
conflicts is contested.  In bankruptcy cases, some courts have found that Erie 
principles do not apply as a formal matter, even as the courts decided cases 
using Erie’s guideposts.98  Others have found that Erie principles apply 
directly.99  And others have stated that federal law applies without 
exception.100 
Transfers also bring up difficult issues.  In Van Dusen v. Barrack,101 the 
Supreme Court held that when a diversity case is transferred from one district 
to another, choice of law should be determined by reference to the state in 
which the transferor court sits.102  The justification for this rule is founded in 
the logic of Erie—as the Court stated, “[W]e should ensure that the ‘accident’ 
of federal diversity jurisdiction does not enable a party to utilize a transfer to 
achieve a result in federal court which could not have been achieved in the 
courts of the State where the action was filed.”103  Less well examined is 
what should happen when a case is transferred from one federal court to 
another but the case is based on federal question jurisdiction.  At least two 
lower courts have found that in such a case, there is no reason to apply Erie 
principles—instead, because jurisdiction is founded on a federal question, the 
law of the transferee court may be applied to the dispute.104  However, several 
 
 97. See, e.g., Schoenberg v. Exportadora de Sal, S.A. de C.V., 930 F.2d 777, 782 (9th Cir. 
1991); Barkanic v. Gen. Admin. of Civil Aviation of the People’s Republic of China, 923 F.2d 
957, 959–61 (2d Cir. 1991) (choosing to apply state choice of law principles but only after 
applying federal common law and determining that using state law would best accord with 
congressional intent in enacting the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act). 
 98. See, e.g., In re Gillissie, 215 B.R. 370, 377–78 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1997) (“The Court is 
not exercising any jurisdiction based on the diversity of the parties under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, 
(which diversity of citizenship does not exist in any event as all parties to these disputes are 
Illinois residents), but rather is exercising its bankruptcy jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1334 
and the automatic reference rule of the District Court, Local General Rule 2.33(A), by which 
all bankruptcy cases and related adversary proceedings are automatically referred to the 
bankruptcy judges comprising the adjunct unit of the District Court known as the Bankruptcy 
Court via 28 U.S.C. § 151.  Thus, the Court is not obliged to decide the matters at bar as would 
a federal district trial court using state substantive law in a diversity case, as Erie requires, 
because the federal questions under §§ 363(h), 522 and 544(b) must be decided utilizing 
federal bankruptcy jurisdiction along with the Illinois state exemption and fraudulent 
conveyance avoidance issues.”); see also In re Crist, 632 F.2d 1226, 1229 (5th Cir. 1980) 
(holding, in a federal bankruptcy proceeding where disposition of a federal question requires 
reference to state law, that federal courts are not required to apply state choice of law rules but 
are instead free to apply the law considered relevant to the pending controversy). 
 99. See, e.g., In re Hilt, 175 B.R. 747, 753 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1994) (relying on the Erie 
doctrine and the Wright and Miller treatise); In re Conner Corp., 127 B.R. 775, 777–78 (Bankr. 
E.D.N.C. 1991) (finding that Erie generally applies to issues of state law in bankruptcy but 
that Clearfield Trust calls for the application of federal law to commercial paper issues that 
govern the rights and duties of the United States). 
 100. See, e.g., In re Powerburst Corp., 154 B.R. 307, 310 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1993) (applying 
federal choice of law rules in resolving a contract law issue). 
 101. 376 U.S. 612 (1964). 
 102. See id. at 636–37. 
 103. See id. at 638. 
 104. See In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 829 F.2d 1171, 1175 (D.C. Cir. 
1987) (“There is no room in the federal system of review for rote acceptance of the decision 
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courts have applied the Van Dusen approach to transfers involving federal 
law conflicts with little or no analysis.105 
Courts have also failed to apply the basic principle uniformly in cases 
involving supplemental jurisdiction.  Choice of law regarding rules of 
evidence, estoppel, fee shifting, and jury instructions have been resolved in 
varying ways.  Some courts, applying the intuition that Erie applies 
regardless of the basis for jurisdiction, have concluded that state law 
controls.106  Others have applied federal law.107  A number of circuits have 
held that the federal law of privilege governs where the evidence sought is 
relevant to both federal and state law claims.108  Indeed, in the lead up to the 
 
of a court outside the chain of direct review.”); Greyhound Fin. Corp. v. Willyard, No. 87-C-
0911B, 1989 WL 201094, at *14 (D. Utah Dec. 26, 1989) (“The court declines to apply the 
Van Dusen holding to litigation based on federal question subject matter jurisdiction.”). 
 105. See, e.g., Hooper v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 688 F.3d 1037, 1046 (9th Cir. 2012) 
(collecting cases); In re Plumbing Fixtures, 342 F. Supp. 756, 758 (J.P.M.L. 1972) (“It is clear 
that the substantive law of the transferor forum will apply after transfer.”). See generally 
Richard L. Marcus, Conflicts Among Circuits and Transfers Within the Federal Judicial 
System, 93 YALE L.J. 677, 692 n.100 (1984) (citing cases extending Van Dusen to federal 
conflicts of law). 
 106. See, e.g., Bradley v. City of Ferndale, 148 F. App’x 499, 511 (6th Cir. 2005) (looking 
to state law to determine if a denial of immunity is subject to interlocutory appeal, where the 
state law claim is supplemental to the § 1983 claim); Aliotta v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 
315 F.3d 756, 759 (7th Cir. 2003) (applying state law to a jury instructions issue involving a 
state law claim in which there was federal question jurisdiction); In re Larry’s Apartment, 
L.L.C., 249 F.3d 832, 837–38 (9th Cir. 2001) (applying state law to a determination of 
attorney’s fees in a state law claim when the court was sitting in diversity); Mangold v. Cal. 
Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 67 F.3d 1470, 1478 (9th Cir. 1995) (applying state law to determine the 
fee award where plaintiff in a civil rights case prevailed on federal and state causes of action); 
Alvarado v. Fed. Express Corp., Nos. C 04-0098 SI, C 04-0099 SI, 2008 WL 2340211 (N.D. 
Cal. June 5, 2008) (holding that federal law would govern an award of fees for a verdict based 
solely on Title VII, but applying Erie doctrine because verdicts were based on both federal 
and state law claims); Chin v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 461 F. Supp. 2d 279, 283 (D.N.J. 2006) 
(applying state law regarding attorney’s fees in a case in which supplemental jurisdiction was 
exerted over state law claims). 
 107. See, e.g., Lydon v. Bos. Sand & Gravel Co., 175 F.3d 6, 11–13, 12 n.3 (1st Cir. 1999) 
(applying the federal law of judicial estoppel to a state law claim that had been removed based 
on complete preemption by the Labor Management Relations Act); Tucker v. United States, 
143 F. Supp. 2d 619, 622–25 (S.D. W. Va. 2001) (applying federal privilege law to a Federal 
Tort Claims Act claim and to a pendent claim based on state law, based both on the 
interpretation of Federal Rule of Evidence 501 and principles of uniformity); see also 
McDaniel v. Smith, No. CV507-79, 2008 WL 4425305, at *10–11 (S.D. Ga. Sept. 30, 2008) 
(applying federal law to the question of when service must be effectuated in a case in which a 
state law claim was asserted as pendent to a federal claim; the court asserted that Erie has no 
application at all in cases in which § 1331 is the basis for jurisdiction); Park v. City of San 
Antonio, No. SA-03-CA-0491-RF, 2006 WL 2519503 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2006) (involving 
attorney’s fees in a state law claim supplemental to a § 1983 claim); Globetrotter Software, 
Inc. v. Elan Comput. Grp., Inc., 63 F. Supp. 2d 1127, 1129–30 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (applying 
anti-SLAPP law to state law claims asserted pendent to federal question claims but not to 
federal question claims); In re Combustion, Inc., 161 F.R.D. 51, 53–54 (W.D. La.), aff’d, 161 
F.R.D. 54 (W.D. La. 1995) (finding federal law applied across the board in part because the 
relevant statutes both provided for exclusive jurisdiction). 
 108. See, e.g., Hancock v. Hobbs, 967 F.2d 462, 466–67 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding that 
federal privilege law supplies the rule of decision in a federal civil rights case, even if witness 
testimony is relevant to pendent state law claims); Hancock v. Dodson, 958 F.2d 1367, 1372–
73 (6th Cir. 1992) (applying federal privilege law to all claims in a federal civil rights case 
with pendent state law claims); Von Bulow v. Von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 141 (2d Cir. 1987) 
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adoption of Federal Rule of Evidence 501, the Senate Judiciary Committee 
was concerned about how courts would apply the rule in federal question 
cases with supplemental state law claims.109  In contrast to the circuits that 
held otherwise, Federal Rule of Evidence 501 states that where state law 
“supplies the rules of decision,” privilege claims should be governed by state 
law.110  In Wm. T. Thompson Co. v. General Nutrition Corp.,111 the court 
explained that “applying two separate disclosure rules with respect to 
different claims tried to the same jury would be unworkable” and, therefore, 
held that “when there are federal law claims in a case also presenting state 
law claims, the federal rule favoring admissibility, rather than any state law 
privilege, is the controlling rule.”112  And a federal court in Florida rejected 
application of state law on cost shifting to a state law claim because it would 
undermine enforcement of the federal claim that provided the basis for 
jurisdiction.113 
Only a few courts have recognized that the Erie doctrine might apply 
differently in federal question cases.  A court in the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania has suggested that the role of state law may differ in federal 
question and diversity cases, even where the state law claim is pendent to a 
federal question claim.114  And a court in the Southern District of New York 
rested on federal common law in a federal question case involving a state law 
claim even though a party alleged diversity of citizenship as an alternative 
ground for jurisdiction.115  A district court in New Jersey also has suggested 
 
(applying federal privilege law where the evidence relates to both the state and federal claims 
in a RICO action with pendent state law claims); Wm. T. Thompson Co. v. Gen. Nutrition 
Corp., 671 F.2d 100, 104 (3d Cir. 1982) (applying federal privilege law to all claims in a 
federal antitrust action with pendent state law claims); Mem’l Hosp. v. Shadur, 664 F.2d 1058, 
1061 n.3 (7th Cir. 1981) (holding that federal law controls on the question of privilege, 
notwithstanding the presence of a state law claim, in a federal antitrust action). 
 109. Martin I. Kaminsky, State Evidentiary Privileges in Federal Civil Litigation, 43 
FORDHAM L. REV. 923, 958–60 (1975) (detailing the history of the adoption of Federal Rule 
of Evidence 501, and noting that many commentators, and the Senate Judiciary Committee, 
worried over how the Rule should apply in federal question cases with pendent state law 
claims—some of the critics thought that it was possible that witness testimony would be 
admitted on some claims but not others, although relevant to both). 
 110. FED. R. EVID. 501; see also In re Yasmin & Yaz (Drospirenone) Mktg., Sales Practices 
& Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 3:09-md-02100-DRH-PMF, 2011 WL 1375011, at *6–7, *15 (S.D. 
Ill. Apr. 12, 2011) (MDL action). 
 111. 671 F.2d 100 (3d Cir. 1982). 
 112. See id. at 104.  Likewise, within the Fourth Circuit, the court in the class action case 
of Lewis v. Capital Mortgage Investments, 78 F.R.D. 295, 313 (D. Md. 1977), rejected the 
argument that state law supplies the rule of decision simply because there was a pendent state 
law claim. 
 113. See Keesee v. Bank of Am., NA, 371 F. Supp. 2d 1370, 1376–77 (M.D. Fla. 2005) 
(holding that a state law on cost shifting did not apply, regardless of any Erie analysis, because 
it would undermine federal law or diminish a federal right), abrogated by Menchise v. 
Akerman Senterfitt, 532 F.3d 1146 (11th Cir. 2008). 
 114. See Reitz v. Dieter, 840 F. Supp. 353, 354–55 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (noting that the 
applicability of a Pennsylvania attorney’s fees provision may be different in diversity cases 
than in federal question cases, even in a case in which a state law claim was pendent to a 
federal claim). 
 115. See Monroy v. Citibank, N.A., No. 84 CIV. 1040 (MJL), 1985 WL 1768, at *2–4 
(S.D.N.Y. June 21, 1985) (relying on federal common law in a case in which jurisdiction is 
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that questions about the scope of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure arise 
in diversity cases, but not federal question cases—the distinction was 
unnecessary to resolution of the case, however.116  A court in the District of 
Connecticut held that federal choice-of-law rules should apply where 
jurisdiction was founded on both diversity and the presence of a federal 
question,117 in part because the case involved application of a law that was 
enacted prior to the Erie decision.118  The court accepted that this could mean 
that results would differ if the case were sitting solely in diversity but argued 
that the Supremacy Clause would not tolerate applying state law.119 
The assumption that Erie applies regardless of the grounds for jurisdiction 
was not always seen as obvious.120  Part of the confusion rested on the 
question of whether Erie was a decision founded on constitutional law or 
simply an interpretation of the RDA.121  The Supreme Court itself in 1947 
stated, in the estoppel context, that federal courts sitting in diversity must 
follow state law and state policy but that this is not necessarily the case for 
federal courts sitting in federal question jurisdiction.122 
II.  EXAMINING THE BASES FOR THE ORTHODOX VIEW 
As established in Part I, the scholarly and judicial community is almost 
completely united in adherence to the position that Erie doctrine applies in 
the same way to state law claims, whatever the basis for federal court 
jurisdiction.  And when one examines the relevant scholarship and 
jurisprudence in detail, the sources for this common and accepted wisdom 
are nearly always the same.  To support the claim that pendent state law 
claims in federal question cases are governed by Erie, most scholars and 
courts look to United Mine Workers v. Gibbs,123 the Supreme Court’s seminal 
 
founded on a federal question through the Edge Act, 12 U.S.C. § 632 (2012), but in which the 
claim was created by state law; jurisdiction had also been alleged under the alternative ground 
of diversity). 
 116. See Fitzgerald v. Gann Law Books, Inc., 956 F. Supp. 2d 581, 586 (D.N.J. 2013) 
(suggesting that a question about the scope of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure arises in 
diversity cases, not federal question cases). 
 117. See Quadrini v. Sikorsky Aircraft Div., United Aircraft Corp., 425 F. Supp. 81, 88 
(D. Conn. 1977) (holding that federal choice of law rules should apply in a case in which the 
court exercised federal question and diversity jurisdiction). 
 118. See id. at 88 (noting that when the relevant federal law was passed, Swift was still good 
law). 
 119. See id. at 85 (“I assume that whatever substantive law is found to be applicable in the 
exercise of this Court’s federal question jurisdiction should govern the lawsuit, even though a 
contrary result might be reached if only diversity jurisdiction existed.  It seems to be a fair 
inference from the Supremacy Clause that whatever decision a federal court is impelled to 
reach in the exercise of its federal question jurisdiction must prevail over contrary results that 
would be reached if the Court were functioning essentially as a state court in the exercise of 
diversity jurisdiction.”). 
 120. In re Longhorn Sec. Litig., 573 F. Supp. 278, 280 & n.1 (W.D. Okla. 1983) (describing 
“jurisprudential uncertainty in the post [Erie] universe”). 
 121. See Seaboard Fin. Co. v. Davis, 276 F. Supp. 507, 512–13 (N.D. Ill. 1967). 
 122. See Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183, 192 (1947) (“Of course, where resort is had to 
a federal court not on grounds of diversity of citizenship but because a federal right is claimed, 
the limitations upon the courts of a State do not control a federal court sitting in the State.”). 
 123. 383 U.S. 715 (1966). 
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supplemental jurisdiction decision.124  In support of the view that Erie 
requires the application of state law in certain federal question cases, 
regardless of which sovereign created the cause of action, many scholars and 
judges turn to Hart & Wechsler,125 the Wright and Miller treatise,126 
Commissioner v. Bosch,127 or United States v. Standard Oil.128  As will be 
discussed below (and as already has been discussed in the case of Standard 
Oil and related cases),129 however, not one of these sources adequately 
explains or even supports the views expressed by the vast majority of scholars 
and judges. 
The treatises are relatively uninformative.  The Wright and Miller treatise 
states succinctly that the view that Erie applies only to diversity cases “is 
simply wrong,”130 citing to a Second Circuit decision that itself cites to Hart 
and Wechsler.131  The Wright treatise also cites to Gibbs and Bosch, among 
other opinions.132  Hart and Wechsler observe that the understanding that 
Erie applies regardless of the basis of jurisdiction “has gained general 
acceptance.”133  The two cases principally relied upon, Gibbs and Bosch, 
require more discussion but do not clarify matters. 
 
 124. See, e.g., Childress, supra note 26, at 1545 n.96 (citing Gibbs and stating that Erie 
applies to state law claims heard in federal court via supplemental jurisdiction); Dorf, supra 
note 27, at 284 & nn.221–22 (citing Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725) (stating that federal courts follow 
state law in diversity cases, supplemental claims in federal question cases, and cases involving 
due process where the court must first resolve an issue of state law); Matasar, supra note 27, 
at 1489 & n.401 (citing Gibbs for the proposition that questions of state law are governed by 
Erie in federal question cases); Yonover, supra note 27, at 310 n.22; see also Fondrk v. 
Westmoreland County, No. Civ.A. 04-0900, 2006 WL 1699471, at *2 (W.D. Pa. June 20, 
2006); Kline v. Sec. Guards, Inc., 159 F. Supp. 2d 848, 851 (E.D. Pa. 2001). 
 125. See, e.g., Campos, supra note 21, at 1586 n.73; Chow, supra note 27, at 166 n.4; 
Gluck, supra note 21, at 1926 n.87; Gluck, The Federal Common Law of Statutory 
Interpretation, supra note 27, at 785 n.122. 
 126. See, e.g., Gluck, supra note 21, at 1926; see also Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal., Inc. v. 
Marfork Coal Co., 966 F. Supp. 2d 667, 678 n.6 (S.D. W. Va. 2013) (citing the Wright and 
Miller treatise for the proposition that it “simply is wrong” to maintain that Erie applies only 
in diversity cases); Monmouth Cty. Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 643 F. Supp. 1217, 1221 
(D.N.J. 1986) (citing the Wright and Miller treatise), aff’d in part, modified in part, 834 F.2d 
326 (3d Cir. 1987); In re Hilt, 175 B.R. 747, 753 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1994) (same). 
 127. 387 U.S. 465 (1967); see, e.g., Saunders, supra note 36, at 722 n.33 (citing Bosch, 387 
U.S. 456); see also Fondrk, 2006 WL 1699471, at *2 (citing Bosch, 387 U.S. 456); Hernas v. 
City of Hickory Hills, 507 F. Supp. 103, 105 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (citing Bosch, 387 U.S. at 461). 
 128. 382 U.S. 301 (1947); see, e.g., Calvin R. Massey, Abstention and the Constitutional 
Limits of the Judicial Power of the United States, 1991 BYU L. REV. 811, 845 (citing Standard 
Oil, 332 U.S. at 307). 
 129. See supra notes 79–96 and accompanying text (noting that the Court has consistently 
declined to apply the Erie doctrine in federal question cases even where state law claims and 
issues were present). 
 130. See supra note 24. 
 131. Maternally Yours v. Your Maternity Shop, 234 F.2d 538, 540 n.1 (2d Cir. 1956) (“But 
despite repeated statements implying the contrary, it is the source of the right sued upon, and 
not the ground on which federal jurisdiction over the case is founded, which determines the 
governing law.” (citing HENRY M. HART & HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND 
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 690–700 (1953))). 
 132. 19 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 24, § 4520 nn.6, 9 & 11. 
 133. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND 
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 589 (7th ed. 2015). 
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A.  United Mine Workers v. Gibbs 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Gibbs is frequently cited by both 
courts134 and commentators135 in support of the proposition that Erie applies 
to state law claims brought in federal court through pendent jurisdiction.  In 
Gibbs, the principal question involved whether subject matter jurisdiction 
even existed for state law claims between nondiverse parties when those 
claims related in some way to claims that were created by federal law and 
amenable to arising under jurisdiction.136  The Court famously held that if 
the state law claims shared a “common nucleus of operative fact” over claims 
for which there was an independent basis for subject matter jurisdiction, a 
federal court could exercise supplemental jurisdiction.137 
While confirming the jurisdictional power of federal courts to assert 
pendent jurisdiction, the Gibbs Court also gave lower courts discretion to 
decline to exercise that power.  Explaining the reason for this discretion, the 
Court stated that if “considerations of judicial economy, convenience and 
fairness” do not justify the assertion of pendent jurisdiction, “a federal court 
should hesitate to exercise jurisdiction over state claims, even though bound 
to apply state law to them.”138  To support the concluding clause, the Court 
cited Erie, and it is this sparse language that many scholars and courts rely 
on for the proposition that Erie translates seamlessly from diversity cases to 
claims present in federal court via supplemental jurisdiction. 
It should be clear from this discussion that the language relied upon did 
not purport to apply Erie to pendent state law claims but was phrased in the 
abstract.  This on its own may be insufficient to question the reliance placed 
on Gibbs, but the Court’s treatment of the substantive issues in the case, 
virtually ignored by the commentators, raises serious questions.  In Gibbs, it 
must be remembered, the jury found against the plaintiff on his federal law 
claims but awarded damages for state law claims for conspiracy and an 
unlawful boycott.  After the Court found that the district court permissibly 
retained jurisdiction over the state law claims, it reversed liability under state 
law.  In so doing, the Court applied a federal statute, section 6 of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act, to limit the reach of state law, without any Erie or RDA 
analysis.139  Indeed, the Court acknowledged that section 6 essentially 
established a higher burden of proof for such claims brought against labor 
unions, whether sourced in state or federal law.140  Thus, even in Gibbs, the 
 
 134. See, e.g., Fondrk v. Westmoreland County, No. Civ.A. 04-0900, 2006 WL 1699471, 
at *2 (W.D. Pa. June 20, 2006); Kline v. Sec. Guards, Inc., 159 F. Supp. 2d 848, 851 (E.D. Pa. 
2001). 
 135. See supra note 124 and accompanying text. 
 136. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 721 (1966). 
 137. Id. at 725.  Supplemental jurisdiction doctrine evolved substantially from Gibbs until 
Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Judicial Improvement Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 
tit. 3, § 310, 104 Stat. 5089, 5113 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2012)).  The Gibbs nucleus 
test was essentially codified in § 1367(a). 
 138. See Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726 (emphasis added) (citing Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 
64, 64 (1938)). 
 139. Id. at 735–42. 
 140. See id. at 736–37. 
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Court did not simply consider itself bound to apply state law, and only state 
law, to pendent state law claims, despite the abstract language relied upon so 
heavily by courts and commentators.141 
B.  Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch 
If Gibbs is the case cited for the proposition that Erie applies with equal 
force in supplemental jurisdiction cases, Bosch, a 1967 tax case, plays the 
same role for those who insist that Erie applies with equal force in federal 
question and diversity cases.142  A close read of Bosch, however, suggests 
the contrary.  In Bosch, the Supreme Court addressed the validity of a tax 
deduction under 26 U.S.C. § 2056(b)(5), which permits “marital” deductions 
against the estate tax.143  Central to the case was whether the decedent’s wife 
validly executed an instrument related to the disposition of an inter vivos 
trust.144  A state trial court, in a separate proceeding, had determined that the 
execution was valid under state law, and the Supreme Court was therefore 
compelled to determine the extent to which this state law determination was 
binding in the federal tax court proceeding.145 
To answer this question, the Court turned first to congressional intent 
regarding the federal tax provision at issue, not to Erie.146  The Court 
 
 141. Nor is there any evidence that the Court’s internal deliberations considered the issue 
that scholars have taken to be resolved by Gibbs.  None of the Court’s internal conference 
notes or correspondence indicate that any of the Justices were focused on the Erie question.  
Justice William Brennan’s initial draft of the opinion, which was never circulated, contained 
the language and citation to Erie referenced above, as did the first opinion circulated to his 
colleagues on March 3, 1966.  Two additional drafts were circulated to the Court, but neither 
of them included different language regarding Erie.  The only notable difference involved the 
discussion of section 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.  The initial uncirculated draft and the 
March 3 draft both omitted any reference to there even being a dispute about whether Norris-
LaGuardia applied to the state law claims.  The draft circulated March 24, however, included 
the following implicit recognition of a dispute (also found in the final opinion): 
Petitioner vigorously contends that § 6 applied to the state claims in this case; that, 
on this record, it cannot be charged with having participated in or authorized the 
violence of August 15–16; and that its acts once it learned of the violence fell short 
of what would be necessary to show either ratification of the violence or any intent 
to build its picketing campaign upon the fears the violence engendered. We agree. 
Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 735; see also United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, No. 243, draft op. at 19 (U.S. 
Mar. 24, 1966).  “Petitioner vigorously contends” is apparently a reference to the United Mine 
Workers’ merits brief, which addressed a few pages to establishing that section 6 of Norris-
LaGuardia applied to the state law claims (again without specifying the RDA). Brief for 
Petitioners at 32–36, Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (No. 243), 1965 WL 115405, at *32–36. 
 142. See, e.g., Jack Moore, United States v. White:  The Second Circuit Validates an IRS 
Role in Policing State Probate Practice, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 669, 681–82 (1990); Saunders, 
supra note 36, at 663 n.33 (“There is sufficient authority to support the proposition that the 
doctrine applies in all actions regardless of the basis of federal jurisdiction unless a sufficient 
federal interest exists to mandate the application of federal common law.” (citing Comm’r v. 
Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456 (1967))); Yonover, supra note 27, at 310 n.22. 
 143. See Bosch, 387 U.S. at 459–61. 
 144. Id. at 473; see also Moore, supra note 142, at 681 n.75. 
 145. See Bosch, 387 U.S. at 464. 
 146. Indeed, the Court recognized that some lower courts had found that the question was 
parallel to, if not controlled by, Erie principles. See id. at 463 (citing Faulkerson’s Estate v. 
United States, 301 F.2d 231 (7th Cir. 1962), as an example of this view).  After identifying 
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examined the legislative history regarding the enactment of the marital 
deduction and noted that it “used very guarded language in referring to the 
very question involved here,” stating that “‘proper regard,’ not finality” 
should be given to state court interpretations of inter vivos instruments.147  
The Court then turned to the RDA, and the associated Erie doctrine, to note 
that its reading of congressional intent was “in keeping” with the policies 
enunciated therein.148  And it finally closed with the language that most 
commentators have focused on over the years: 
This is not a diversity case but the same principle may be applied for the 
same reasons, viz., the underlying substantive rule involved is based on 
state law and the State’s highest court is the best authority on its own 
law. . . .  In this respect, [a federal court hearing a case involving 
application of a federal statute in which an underlying issue of state law is 
presented] may be said to be, in effect, sitting as a state court.149 
This language, taken out of context, might suggest that Erie controls all 
questions of state law presented in federal question cases, but the discussion 
preceding it suggests the contrary.  Moreover, the Court followed this key 
language with the observation that its approach in this case “would be fair to 
the taxpayer and protect the federal revenue as well,”150 suggesting the 
relevance of these variables to its consideration of the question. 
The dissenting opinions in Bosch also suggest that a straightforward 
application of the Erie doctrine did not resolve the issue.  Justice William 
Douglas, writing alone, argued that the Court was, in fact, departing from the 
Erie doctrine by permitting a federal court to ignore a state court decision 
simply because it was not announced by the state’s highest court.151  Under 
his interpretation of the Court’s prior decisions, unless there was reason to 
suspect fraud or otherwise question the validity of the state court 
determination, Erie required its application to a case like Bosch.152  Justices 
John Marshall Harlan II and Abe Fortas, by contrast, found Erie and the RDA 
to provide “relevant guidance” but read the Court as adopting a rule founded 
not solely on Erie but also on federal interests in tax collection.153  The risk 
of the majority’s view, according to these dissenters, could be “widely 
 
this view, the Court stated, “We look at the problem differently,” understanding it instead as 
a question of legislative intent. Id. 
 147. Id. at 464 (quoting S. REP. NO. 80-1013, pt. 2, at 4 (1948)). 
 148. See id. 
 149. Id. at 456. 
 150. See id. (emphasis added). 
 151. See id. at 466 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 152. Id. at 471 (“[W]here, absent [fraud, collusion, or other indications of unreliability], a 
state court has reached a deliberate conclusion, where it has construed state law, the federal 
court should consider the decision to be an exposition of the controlling state law and give it 
effect as such.”). 
 153. In explaining their disagreements with both the majority opinion and Justice 
Douglas’s dissent, Justices Harlan and Fortas noted that the latter placed too much reliance on 
the importance of “uniformity in the administration of law within each of the States,” while 
the former placed too much weight on the “hazards to the federal fisc from dubious decisions 
of lower state courts.” Id. at 477–79 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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destructive both of the proper relationship between state and federal law and 
of the uniformity of the administration of law within a State.”154 
Thus, Bosch did not, as many commentators and courts suggest, adopt 
Erie’s rule and apply it wholesale to state law issues raised in federal question 
cases.  Rather, the Court looked to both congressional intent regarding the 
particular substantive federal statute at issue and salient federal interests to 
conclude that, in the particular context of Bosch, interpretations of state law 
should be determined by reference to the decisions of the state’s highest 
court. 
III.  ERIE AND THE NUANCED 
SUBSTANTIVE/PROCEDURAL INQUIRY 
To this point, I have shown that there is an orthodox view that Erie controls 
in federal question cases, that courts and commentators have generally failed 
to examine what this means when state law and federal law are intertwined, 
and that the bases for the orthodoxy are insufficient.  To move to a different 
framework, however, requires a return to Erie and its progeny.  All of the 
Erie jurisprudence discussed herein revolves around the meaning of the 
RDA, which provides: 
The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or treaties of 
the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be 
regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United 
States, in cases where they apply.155 
The RDA was originally enacted as section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 
and has remained essentially unchanged since that time.156  There was 
recognition from the start that vesting concurrent jurisdiction over state law 
claims in both federal and state courts could present the possibility of 
conflicts.157  Much ink has been spilled regarding whether Erie itself 
correctly divined the RDA’s drafters’ intended resolution of such 
conflicts,158 but, for the purposes of this Article, I take Erie’s interpretation 
of the RDA as a given. 
 
 154. Id. at 480.  Thus, Harlan and Fortas argued that state court determinations of state law 
should be controlling, regardless of their procedural level unless the state court proceeding 
was not “genuinely” adversarial. Id. at 481. 
 155. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2012). 
 156. It was codified as part of the U.S. Code in 1948, at which time Congress made clear 
that it applied to equitable claims as well as legal claims. See Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 
62 Stat. 944 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1652). 
 157. See Wythe Holt, “To Establish Justice”:  Politics, the Judiciary Act of 1789, and the 
Invention of the Federal Courts, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1421, 1487 n.232. 
 158. Compare Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 
1789, 37 HARV. L. REV. 49, 86 (1923) (providing the argument relied upon by the Erie Court, 
based on legislative history of the RDA), with W. RITZ, REWRITING THE HISTORY OF THE 
JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789:  EXPOSING MYTHS, CHALLENGING PREMISES, AND USING NEW 
EVIDENCE 126–48 (1990) (“The one thing that can be said with assurance is that Section 34 
was not intended to apply exclusively to diversity proceedings; that it was not intended to 
direct the application of the law of particular states in diversity proceedings; and that it was 
not intended to apply to suits in equity.  In short, on its historical basis, Erie is dead wrong.”), 
and Holt, supra note 157, at 1506–07 (arguing in support of Ritz’s interpretation). 
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The central questions regarding application of the RDA have revolved 
around when a federal court must apply state law and which state law it must 
then apply.  In Swift v. Tyson,159 a case founded on diversity jurisdiction, the 
Court held that federal courts are bound to apply state law but only to the 
extent that the state law was found in positive law.  Where state law was 
found only in the common law decisions of state courts, by contrast, the Swift 
Court held that there was no requirement that federal courts follow those state 
court decisions.160  As the Swift Court conceptualized it, state court decisions 
“are, at most, only evidence of what the laws are, and are not, of themselves, 
laws.”161  Swift thus famously ushered in the era of federal common law.162 
For nearly one hundred years, federal courts were free to apply their own 
interpretation of common law principles, even in diversity cases, but in Erie, 
the Supreme Court overruled Swift.163  For the Erie Court, Swift was wrong 
because it was based on a misinterpretation of the RDA, created perverse 
outcomes, and was based on an unsupportable vision of the power of federal 
courts.164  Thus, after Erie, it was commonly understood that, whatever the 
source of state law, the RDA required that state law be applied, where 
applicable. 
But therein, of course, lay the rub:  Just when could a federal court rely on 
federal law, whether created by statutes, the newly christened Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, or even federal common law?  Erie’s progeny clarified 
the answer to this question.  First, in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York,165 another 
diversity case, the Court held that, to the extent that a federal court was 
choosing between clashing federal and state law, the RDA only required the 
application of state substantive law.166  This nuance was absent in Erie, 
except to the extent that Justice Stanley Reed’s concurrence predicted the 
problem,167 because the state law applied in Erie—relating to the obligations 
owed by a railroad company to a trespasser or invitee—was indisputably 
substantive.  But in Guaranty Trust, the Court had to address whether the 
conflict at issue—relating to a statute of limitations—was substantive, in 
which event the RDA required the application of state law, or procedural, 
which would permit a federal court to apply its own law, whatever the 
source.168  The Court ultimately suggested that, to the extent that a choice 
between federal and state law would change the outcome of the litigation, it 
must be deemed substantive and the state law must be applied.169 
Guaranty Trust’s outcome-determinative test was overly simplistic, in 
large part because parties were unlikely to quarrel over the choice between 
 
 159. 41 U.S. 1 (1842). 
 160. Id. at 18–19. 
 161. Id. at 18. 
 162. Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 60 (2006). 
 163. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79–80 (1938). 
 164. Molot, supra note 162, at 71–80. 
 165. 326 U.S. 99 (1945). 
 166. Id. at 107–08. 
 167. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 91–92 (Reed, J., concurring). 
 168. Guaranty Tr., 326 U.S. at 107–08. 
 169. Id. at 109. 
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federal and state law unless it changed the outcome of the case.  In three 
decisions after Guaranty Trust, all announced in 1949, the capaciousness of 
the outcome-determinative test proved troublesome, especially as it related 
to the clash between state laws and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  
Thus, in Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co.,170 the Court held 
that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 3’s statement that an action 
“commenced” with its filing did not determine the tolling of the statute of 
limitations in a diversity case, where Kansas law provided that an action 
“commenced” for the purpose of tolling when it was served on the defendant.  
And in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.,171 the Court held that the 
RDA required that a federal court apply a New Jersey statute requiring a 
plaintiff in a shareholder derivative suit to post a bond even though the 
applicable Federal Rule of Civil Procedure contained no such requirement.  
Similarly, in Woods v. Interstate Realty Co.,172 the Court held that a 
Tennessee corporation could not bring a diversity action in a federal court in 
Mississippi if, by virtue of its failure to qualify to do business in that state, 
the Mississippi state courts would bar such an action.  In all three of these 
cases, the Court applied Guaranty Trust’s outcome-determinative test to 
determine the Erie question, and in all three cases, the Court displaced federal 
law. 
The Court added another layer to the Erie analysis in Byrd v. Blue Ridge 
Cooperative,173 another diversity case in which the Court displaced state law 
in favor of conflicting federal law.  In Byrd, the critical question was whether 
the plaintiff was considered a “statutory employee,” in which case he was 
prohibited from suing his employer in tort and was limited to recovery 
delineated by South Carolina’s workers’ compensation scheme.174  South 
Carolina vested fact-finding authority as to this question to a judge, whereas 
federal law would permit the parties to invoke their Seventh Amendment 
right to a jury trial on the question.175  In Byrd, the Court equivocated as to 
whether the conflict between state and federal law was “outcome-
determinative” as that term had been used in Guaranty Trust176 but 
nonetheless found that resolving the Erie question involved the additional 
step of considering whether federal interests in applying federal law 
outweighed countervailing state interests.177  In Byrd itself, the Court found 
that there was essentially no articulated state interest that justified vesting 
fact-finding authority with the judge, while the federal interest resided in the 
Seventh Amendment, making the balancing inquiry relatively 
straightforward.178 
 
 170. 337 U.S. 530 (1949). 
 171. 337 U.S. 541 (1949). 
 172. 337 U.S. 535 (1949). 
 173. 356 U.S. 525 (1958). 
 174. Id. at 527–28. 
 175. Id. at 533–37. 
 176. Compare id. at 537 (suggesting that the difference was outcome determinative), with 
id. at 539–40 (suggesting the opposite). 
 177. Id. at 540. 
 178. Id. at 538–39. 
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After Byrd, the Erie analysis involved a three-step process.  First a federal 
court was required to determine whether a conflict existed between federal 
law and state law.  If no conflict existed, then no further Erie inquiry was 
necessary.  If a conflict was found, the court asked whether it was outcome-
determinative.  A negative answer resulted in application of federal law, on 
the theory that the conflict only implicated substantive (and hence state-law-
derived) rights if it was outcome determinative.  Even outcome-determinative 
conflicts, however, required a third inquiry—Byrd’s balancing of federal 
versus state interests to determine whether, even in the face of an outcome-
determinative conflict, federal law should govern.179 
One could conceptualize this inquiry as serving at least two, somewhat 
different, purposes.  First, the resort to Byrd balancing could be a means of 
operationalizing the RDA’s instruction that state law applies in federal court 
“except where the Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of 
Congress otherwise require or provide.”180  The difficulty with this 
conception is that the Erie analysis applies whether the source of state law is 
positive law or judge-made common law.181  A competing conception of the 
work that this Erie analysis accomplishes is that, by asking whether there are 
significant state interests at stake in what appears to be an outcome-
determinative conflict, the Court is essentially double-checking the intuition 
that outcome-determinative conflicts are substantive.  On this account, the 
absence of state interests behind a rule that is outcome-determinative likely 
indicates that it does not vindicate substantive judgments. 
To this point, the Court had addressed Erie in cases that involved conflicts 
between state law and federal law of all kinds, both positive law and common 
law, without any suggestion that the source of federal law affected the 
analysis.  But in Hanna v. Plumer,182 the Court introduced two new 
innovations in the Erie analysis, one of which is central to this Article.  First, 
and of less interest for these purposes, the Court clarified that, where the 
source of federal law in any federal-state conflict is created by statute or a 
Federal Rule, the “relatively unguided” Erie analysis was not applicable.183  
Instead, a reviewing court must ask whether the positive law forecloses 
application of the competing state law and, if so, whether the Constitution 
(and in the case of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Rules Enabling Act) 
authorizes the federal positive law in question.184 
More importantly for the purposes of this Article, however, the Hanna 
Court also further clarified that the Erie-Guaranty Trust-Byrd analysis 
governed conflicts between state law and federal judge-made law.185  Most 
significantly, the Court stated that the outcome-determinative test introduced 
 
 179. For an example of Byrd balancing, see Wallis v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 384 
U.S. 63, 67–69 (1966), where the Court declined to rely on federal common law in a diversity 
action because there was “no significant threat to any identifiable federal policy or interest.” 
 180. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2012) (emphasis added). 
 181. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). 
 182. 380 U.S. 460 (1965). 
 183. Id. at 470–72. 
 184. Id. at 471. 
 185. Id. at 468–69. 
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by Guaranty Trust was not as simple as had been suggested.  The question 
was not whether choosing state or federal law in the particular case would 
alter the outcome—as previously noted, if it were, then nearly every conflict 
presented to a court would pass the test.  Instead, the Court stated that courts 
must answer the outcome-determinative question in light of Erie’s twin aims:  
reducing both forum shopping and inequitable outcomes based on the 
citizenship of the parties.186 
The Court’s reasoning was founded on the relationship between diversity 
jurisdiction and the Erie doctrine.  First, the Court emphasized that the Swift 
doctrine had undermined the very purpose of diversity jurisdiction, which 
was to level the playing field between citizens and noncitizens of a state.187  
Because Swift made choice of law turn on whether the case was brought in 
federal or state court, it gave the out-of-state citizen-plaintiff the power to 
determine choice of law with the initial filing decision.188  Thus, Erie’s 
concern, highlighted by Hanna, about the inequitable administration of the 
laws was directly tied to the mechanics of diversity jurisdiction.  Erie’s 
concern about forum shopping, also highlighted by Hanna, was less directly 
tied to diversity jurisdiction.  Nonetheless, Erie’s concern seemed to be that 
parties had manipulated their own citizenship to create diversity jurisdiction 
so as to take advantage of a particular rule that would be applied under the 
Swift doctrine.189  Nowhere did the Court in Hanna or Erie discuss concerns 
about forum shopping in the context of federal question cases. 
Since Hanna, little has changed with the Erie analysis, at least in its 
outline.  Disagreements have arisen about how to apply some of the 
principles developed from Erie through Hanna, but the principles themselves 
remain constant.  The result the Court arrived at in Gasperini v. Center for 
Humanities, Inc.,190 for example, may have been unorthodox, but its analysis 
was basically consistent with what has been described so far.191  And Shady 
Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Insurance192 involved not the 
“relatively unguided” Erie analysis, which is the focus of this Article, but 
interpretation of the Rules Enabling Act analysis introduced in Hanna. 
 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. at 467. 
 188. If the out-of-state plaintiff wished to take advantage of the state rule, she would file in 
state court, preventing the in-state defendant from removing. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2) (2012) 
(prohibiting removal on diversity grounds if the defendant is a citizen of the state in which suit 
was brought).  If the out-of-state plaintiff sought the benefit of the federal rule, she would file 
in federal court, where the defendant could not shift the case to state court. 
 189. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 73 (1938) (discussing Black & White Taxicab & 
Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518 (1928)); see also 
Hanna, 380 U.S. at 467 n.8 (citing Black & White Taxicab, 276 U.S. at 518). 
 190. 518 U.S. 415 (1996). 
 191. The Court first applied Hanna’s outcome-determinative test before it turned to Byrd 
balancing. Id. at 428–32. 
 192. 559 U.S. 393 (2010). 
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IV.  INTRODUCING ERIE STEP ZERO 
To this point, I have shown that there is an orthodox view that Erie applies 
to all state court claims that arise in federal court, whatever the basis for 
jurisdiction, but that courts and commentators rarely have paid attention to 
whether Erie analysis should function in precisely the same way across 
different jurisdictional contexts.  Moreover, the Erie doctrine itself has been 
justified by policies and concerns that are hard to translate outside of the 
diversity context.  The purpose of this part is to situate Erie analysis in the 
nondiversity context and provide some examples of how Erie might function 
differently outside of § 1332’s diversity jurisdiction. 
In the conventional account, regardless of jurisdictional context, Erie 
analysis consists of a number of steps, beginning with asking whether the 
area in which state law and federal judge-made law conflict can be 
characterized as obviously substantive or arguably procedural.193  To take 
account of the insight I am advancing here, one must start earlier, at “Erie 
Step Zero,” at which we must situate the conflict in its jurisdictional context.  
For the purposes of this analysis, there is no need to revisit Erie analysis in 
its purest form—where state law arises solely in the context of diversity 
jurisdiction.  Traditional Erie analysis is well equipped to address these 
conflicts.  Instead, there are two different jurisdictional contexts that I will 
focus on here—state law claims that arise as supplemental claims in a federal 
question case and state law claims over which a district court may assert 
original jurisdiction because the claim implicates a substantial federal 
interest.  In these contexts, we are presented with three choices:  apply Erie 
analysis as if the case were a diversity case, not consider Erie (or the RDA) 
at all, or find a way to translate the concerns of Erie and its progeny into the 
federal question context. 
The first and second options are not compelling.  As to the first, as I have 
discussed above, if conducting Erie analysis requires consideration of the 
twin aims of Erie as defined by Hanna, many complications would ensue.  
For Hanna may seek to reduce the incentive to forum shop as much as 
possible, but the premise of federal question jurisdiction is that some forum 
shopping is normatively acceptable, if not good.194  We make federal courts 
available to vindicate federal interests because we think that federal courts 
have more experience applying federal law, are more solicitous of federal 
interests, and will strive for uniformity in application.195  Similarly, to the 
extent that Hanna focuses on the potential effect that choice of law will have 
 
 193. See supra Part II. 
 194. See, e.g., Sidney Schenkier, Ensuring Access to Federal Courts:  A Revised Rationale 
for Pendent Jurisdiction, 75 NW. U. L. REV. 245, 254–55 (1980) (stating that one purpose of 
Reconstruction was to provide a federal forum for resolution of federal claims); see also Doe 
v. City of Chicago, 883 F. Supp. 1126, 1134 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (stating that forum shopping is 
not a concern in arising under cases). 
 195. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 312 (2005). 
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on inequitable treatment according to citizenship, this concern does not exist 
in the context of federal question jurisdiction.196 
As to the second possibility, simply ignoring Erie principles and the RDA 
in nondiversity cases is unsupported by the language of the RDA and the 
jurisprudence discussed above.197  The difficulty, however, lies in crafting a 
middle ground between these two extremes. 
To do so, it is worthwhile to return to Hanna, which can guide the inquiry 
in two distinct ways.  First, Hanna clarifies that when one looks at outcome 
determinativeness, one should be looking ex ante rather than ex post—
disputes over choice of law will always be outcome determinative ex post 
because the parties would not be arguing about them otherwise.  Second, 
Hanna suggests that we should construct our choice of law rules to reduce 
inappropriate forum shopping and to minimize inequitable treatment of 
litigants. 
Translating Hanna into the federal-question context, then, requires that our 
outcome-determinative test consider factors other than citizenship and the 
risk that fundamentally state law claims will be driven into federal court to 
take advantage of substantive law derived from federal sources.  Rather than 
inequity based on citizenship, we should be focused on potential inequity 
based on the happenstance that a litigant is able to bring a state law claim into 
a federal forum simply because it overlaps with the factual and legal contours 
of a federal question claim or simply because it implicates the need to resolve 
a substantial federal issue.198  We also would want to avoid adjudicating state 
law claims differently simply because a litigant has chosen to frame them as 
supplemental claims to a federal question anchor if the litigant also could 
have brought them independently as diversity claims.199  And we might 
 
 196. Marsha S. Berzon, Securing Fragile Foundations:  Affirmative Constitutional 
Adjudication in Federal Courts, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 681, 704 (2009) (“A federal court 
enforcing legal principles established by the federal Constitution or by federal statute is not 
generating general common law in the forbidden Erie sense. . . .  Its doing so does not raise 
the worry that litigants with similar claims in state courts may receive substantively different 
outcomes than those in federal court, the ‘mischievous results’ that prompted Erie in the first 
place.” (footnote omitted)). 
 197. One could argue that state law does not “apply” in federal question cases and that 
therefore the RDA is inapplicable, but this begs the question. 
 198. Patrick Woolley, The Sources of Federal Preclusion Law After Semtek, 72 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 527, 557 (2003) (arguing that Erie is better characterized as a policy against “treating 
any litigant who can take advantage of federal jurisdiction differently from those who 
cannot”). 
 199. Note, The Competence of Federal Courts to Formulate Rules of Decision, 77 HARV. 
L. REV. 1084, 1087–88 (1964) (“If such were the rule, not only could a party determine the 
outcome of litigation by a choice of federal or state forum but under some circumstances he 
could determine it by a choice of federal question or diversity jurisdiction.”).  A district court 
decision in a 1942 trademark case is the first, and only, opinion to consider this question in 
the unique jurisdictional context where jurisdiction over state law unfair competition claims 
could be founded on both diversity and supplemental jurisdiction. See Nat’l Fruit Prod. Co. v. 
Dwinell-Wright Co., 47 F. Supp. 499, 501–05 (D. Mass. 1942), aff’d, 140 F.2d 618 (1st Cir. 
1944).  That opinion began by noting that Erie required a close analysis of the choice of law 
to be applied to the unfair competition claims because the Supreme Court had not yet applied 
Erie beyond diversity cases.  The court recognized the arguments in favor of using federal 
common law in an unfair competition claim pendent to a trademark claim and did not dispute 
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further distinguish federal question cases where exclusive jurisdiction is 
present because in that case it is less likely that a litigant has exercised the 
choice to bring supplemental state law claims in federal court simply to take 
advantage of choice of law dynamics.200 
As to forum shopping, we should be on the lookout for cases in which 
parties choose federal court for reasons other than those recognized as valid 
for the purposes of arising under and supplemental jurisdiction.  The 
motivation for bringing pendent state law claims in federal court may have 
nothing to do with forum shopping but instead may relate to efficiency goals 
or rules of preclusion, which create an incentive to bring the claims together 
in the same jurisdiction.201  Indeed, if the federal question claim is the moving 
force in the litigation, the litigant who invokes supplemental jurisdiction may 
fundamentally be motivated by the desire to “resort to the experience, 
solicitude, and hope of uniformity that a federal forum offers on federal 
issues.”202  This choice is one to be supported, not one that should arouse 
suspicion.  And to the extent that forum shopping might be present, it would 
likely be filtered out by a district court’s application of 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1367(c)(2), which authorizes a district court to decline the exercise of 
supplemental jurisdiction when the pendent claim “substantially 
predominates” over the federal question claim.203  When federal question 
jurisdiction is exercised over a state law claim that requires resolution of a 
significant issue of federal law, § 1367 will not operate to weed out cases in 
which state law substantially predominates, but Grable & Sons Metal 
Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering & Manufacturing204 and its progeny will 
likely function in the same way.205 
After one has conducted this outcome-determinative test, modified for 
federal question jurisdiction, there still is the potential that Byrd balancing 
should play a role.  To be sure, if a court decides that the choice between 
 
its power to do so, but ultimately it concluded that in the absence of statutory direction, and 
given that the pendent claim also was brought pursuant to diversity jurisdiction, it would apply 
state law. Id. at 503–05.  The district court was no doubt influenced by its confidence that 
Massachusetts state courts had developed a sophisticated common law for treatment of unfair 
competition claims, but a fair reading of the court’s analysis leaves the impression that this 
was not dispositive. Id. at 504. 
 200. Stein, supra note 37, at 2006 n.161 (making the argument in the context of exclusive 
jurisdiction). 
 201. Erbsen, supra note 35, at 658 n.286. 
 202. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 312 (2005). 
 203. Some ancillary claims, such as third-party claims, may look differently in this light.  
In those cases, neither rules of preclusion nor mandatory joinder rules require that such claims 
be brought in federal court, although efficiency considerations may favor including them. 
 204. 545 U.S. 308 (2005). 
 205. In Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677 (2006), the Court 
described Grable as a case in which the federal issue was “dispositive of the case.” Id. at 700.  
In McVeigh, by contrast, the primary issues were “fact-bound and situation-specific,” causing 
the Court to question why it should “place such a nonstatutory issue under the complete 
governance of federal law, to be declared in a federal forum.” Id. at 701.  Similarly, in Gunn 
v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059 (2013), the Court made clear that a federal issue must be substantial 
both from the parties’ perspective and, more importantly, from the perspective of the “federal 
system as a whole.” Id. at 1066.  Therefore, cases that are heard under the Grable gloss on 
§ 1331 will by definition involve important federal interests. 
2017] ERIE STEP ZERO 2375 
federal and state law is not outcome determinative, then it will be free to 
apply the federal rule.  If a court decides that the choice is outcome 
determinative, however, it should move to Byrd balancing to determine 
whether federal interests are sufficiently important to outweigh the state 
interest in applying its rule.  For if one is concerned that Hanna’s analysis 
gives short shrift to federal interests in diversity cases,206 one should 
presumably be at least as concerned when we move to the federal question 
context.207 
I concede that as a bottom-line matter, this analysis may result in courts 
declaring that some rules are “substantive” for diversity purposes but not for 
federal question purposes, which will be troubling to some.  Some scholars 
already recoil against the related idea of having “dual readings” of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure depending on whether the basis for jurisdiction is 
diversity or federal question.208  But the Supreme Court itself has 
acknowledged at times that the line between substance and procedure might 
differ depending on whether jurisdiction is based on diversity or the presence 
of a federal question.209 
Lower courts have implied the same at times,210 but there is little 
consistency in how courts have addressed the question.  Many courts, 
applying the intuition that Erie applies regardless of the basis for jurisdiction, 
have concluded that state law controls both the federal and supplemental state 
law claims, even if they would have disregarded state law were the federal 
 
 206. Martin H. Redish & Carter G. Phillips, Erie and the Rules of Decision Act:  In Search 
of the Appropriate Dilemma, 91 HARV. L. REV. 356, 360 (1977) (criticizing Hanna precisely 
because it shifted focus from the balance between federal and state interests prioritized in Byrd 
to avoidance of forum shopping and litigant inequity). 
 207. Cf. id. at 384 (“It would be unwise, however, to purchase a possibly greater degree of 
predictability through use of the Hanna test where the price is the exaction of inescapable 
costs on the federal system.”). 
 208. See Jennifer S. Hendricks, In Defense of the Substance-Procedure Dichotomy, 89 
WASH. U. L. REV. 103, 125 (2011). 
 209. Levinson v. Deupree, 345 U.S. 648, 652 (1953).  In Levinson, the Court held that 
federal practice regarding amendments to pleadings applied to an admiralty case but 
recognized that the issue might be analyzed differently were jurisdiction founded on diversity. 
Id. (“Whether, if this were a diversity case, we would consider that we are here dealing with 
‘forms and modes’ or with matters more seriously affecting the enforcement of the right, it is 
clear that we are not dealing with an integral part of the right created by Kentucky.”). 
 210. For example, when lower courts heard Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) 
cases under diversity jurisdiction, as they had assumed that the TCPA did not create a federal 
cause of action, they applied Erie to choice of law disputes. See, e.g., Gottlieb v. Carnival 
Corp., 436 F.3d 335, 342 (2d Cir. 2006); Holster v. Gatco, Inc., 485 F. Supp. 2d 179, 183–84 
(E.D.N.Y. 2007), aff’d, 618 F.3d 214 (2d Cir. 2010), overruled on other grounds, Shady Grove 
Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins., 559 U.S. 393 (2010).  After the Supreme Court 
clarified that the TCPA does create federal question jurisdiction, see Mims v. Arrow Fin. 
Servs. LLC, 565 U.S. 368 (2012), however, lower courts felt free to disregard Erie, see, e.g., 
Bailey v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC, 867 F. Supp. 2d 835, 839–40 (E.D. La. 2012).  Even outside 
of the TCPA context, courts have recognized the possibility that a state law could be 
substantive for diversity but not federal question contexts. See, e.g., Doe v. City of Chicago, 
883 F. Supp. 1126, 1134 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (discussing the role of a state law affidavit of merit 
requirement). 
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claim brought on its own.211  And some, while acknowledging the force of 
the argument that there is a difference between the jurisdictional contexts, 
ask if providing a different approach for such questions is justifiable as a 
practical matter.212  But the lower courts have been forced to address this 
question without sufficient guidance from the Supreme Court or 
commentators.  Therefore, this Article offers some examples of when my 
proposed analysis will and will not affect choice-of-law conclusions. 
Before turning to some specific examples of how Erie Step Zero might 
have back-end choice-of-law consequences, let me first suggest the 
circumstances in which my framework will not alter outcomes.  For example, 
in the supplemental jurisdiction context, if it is possible to isolate and apply 
state law to state claims and federal law to federal claims, then traditional 
Erie analysis should likely control.  If, however, the choice of law relates to 
an issue that cuts across claims or if applying state law will indirectly 
interfere with or prejudice the adjudication of federal claims, then this 
analysis offers reasons to question the traditional Erie analysis.  In those 
circumstances, dépeçage213 may not be available and a court will have to 
choose whether to follow state or federal law.  Some examples follow. 
A.  Erie Step Zero and Privilege Law 
One of the most common areas in which a conflict between state and 
federal law has arisen in federal question cases with supplemental state law 
claims is privilege law.214  Indeed, in the debate regarding the adoption of 
Federal Rule of Evidence 501, the Senate Judiciary Committee was 
concerned about how the Rule 501 would be applied in federal question cases 
 
 211. Bradley v. City of Ferndale, 148 F. App’x 499, 511 (6th Cir. 2005) (looking to state 
law to determine if denial of immunity is subject to interlocutory appeal where a state law 
claim is supplemental to a § 1983 claim); Aliotta v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 315 F.3d 756, 
759 (7th Cir. 2003) (applying state law to a jury instructions issue involving a state law claim 
in which there was federal question jurisdiction); In re Larry’s Apartment, L.L.C., 249 F.3d 
832, 838 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[A] federal court sitting in diversity applies state law in deciding 
whether to allow attorney’s fees when those fees are connected to the substance of the case.”); 
Mangold v. Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 67 F.3d 1470, 1478 (9th Cir. 1995) (applying state law 
to determine the fee award where a plaintiff in a civil rights case prevailed on federal and state 
causes of action); Alvarado v. Fed. Express Corp., Nos. C 04-0098 SI, C 04-0099 SI, 2008 
WL 2340211, at *4 (N.D. Cal. June 5, 2008) (“If the jury had based its verdicts solely on Title 
VII, federal law would govern the award of fees.  Because the jury verdicts were based on 
both federal and state law claims, however, the Erie doctrine dictates that state law governs 
the issuance of attorney fees.”); Chin v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 461 F. Supp. 2d 279, 283 
(D.N.J. 2006) (applying state law regarding attorney’s fees in a case in which state law claims 
were supplemental to claims under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act). 
 212. See, e.g., Erbsen, supra note 35, at 658 n.286 (acknowledging possible difference in 
interpretive approaches, but inviting analysis of whether “such confusing differences are 
necessary in practice”). 
 213. Dépeçage is a choice of law technique in which rules from different legal systems are 
used for different aspects of a lawsuit. See, e.g., Corporacion Venezolana de Fomento v. 
Vintero Sales Corp., 629 F.2d 786, 794 n.8 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 214. Kaminsky, supra note 109, at 948 (recognizing that the question of privileges becomes 
more difficult when there are supplemental state law claims in a federal question case). 
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with pendent state law claims.215  But Rule 501 did not resolve the problem, 
stating unhelpfully that where state law “supplies the rules of decision,” 
privilege claims should be governed by state law.216  The intent was to 
incorporate Erie analysis into Rule 501 because there was some question 
about whether state law as to privileges would be considered “substantive” 
under Hanna.217  This works fine in a diversity case but not in a federal 
question case with pendent state law claims, because states recognize 
privileges from disclosure that could limit both the information disclosed 
during pretrial discovery and the evidence presented at trial.218  If state law 
privileges were applied during pretrial discovery to bar access to information 
relevant to a federal question claim, it could substantially interfere with 
enforcement of a federal right.  If it were enforced during trial, such that 
relevant statements were not admissible at all, even on federal law claims, or 
certain statements were admissible on certain claims but not others, it would 
either directly or indirectly interfere with distinct federal interests. 
Using the framework proposed here, however, would clarify how courts 
should resolve these issues.  For example, if the state law privilege barred 
access to evidence or discovery that was relevant only to the state law claim, 
it could be enforced in full—in this circumstance, there would be no conflict 
between applying state and federal privilege law.  To the extent that there is 
a conflict, however, one could rely on the modified Erie analysis to resolve 
it.  Do we expect, ex ante, that a federal forum was chosen so as to take 
advantage of the federal privilege laws in the adjudication of the state law 
claim?  Is there a concern about inequity in the application of state privilege 
law because of the happenstance that in this case the state law claims share 
common facts with a federal question claim?  Even if the answers to these 
questions suggest that the choice of law is outcome determinative, how 
should the federal interests be balanced against those of the state?  Without 
suggesting an answer to these questions, if enforcement of the state law 
privilege law will have an impact throughout the entire case, it is more likely 
that a court should choose to enforce federal common law. 
As it turns out, most courts have come to a similar conclusion.  Some 
courts have held that federal law applies across the board to both the federal 
claim and pendent state law claims.219  Others have held that the federal law 
 
 215. Id. at 958–60 (detailing rulemakers’ concern that Federal Rule of Evidence 501 might 
apply differently depending on the jurisdictional basis of the claim). 
 216. FED. R. EVID. 501; see also In re Yasmin & Yaz (Drospirenone) Mktg., Sales Practices 
& Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 3:09-md-02100-DRH-PMF, 2011 WL 1375011, at *1 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 
12, 2011) (MDL action). 
 217. See H.R. REP. NO. 93-650, at 9 (1973) (stating that privilege rules should be 
considered substantive for Erie purposes); see also In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 
374, 379 n.6 (3d Cir. 1990); Laxalt v. McClatchy, 116 F.R.D. 438, 446 (D. Nev. 1987); 
Theodore Campagnolo, The Conflict Between State Press Shield Laws and Federal Criminal 
Proceedings:  The Rule 501 Blues, 38 GONZ. L. REV. 445, 500 (2002); Korn, supra note 28, at 
75. 
 218. Rule 501 applies to all stages of a civil proceeding, not just at trial. See FED. R. EVID. 
1101(c). 
 219. See Tucker v. United States, 143 F. Supp. 2d 619, 622–25 (S.D. W. Va. 2001) 
(applying federal privilege law to a Federal Tort Claims Act claim and to a pendent state law 
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of privilege governs where the evidence sought is relevant to both federal and 
state law claims, an outcome more consistent with my proposed 
framework.220  But more difficult questions remain, particularly in the 
context of state law claims for which there is original jurisdiction because of 
an embedded substantial federal issue.  In those cases, it may be impossible 
to apply state privilege law to part of the claim and federal privilege law to 
the rest, but it may also be difficult to define which sovereign provides the 
rule of decision.  Applying my framework, however, it seems unlikely that 
one should even conclude that the choice between federal and state law is 
outcome determinative in the relevant sense, for the very reason that federal 
jurisdiction is available for the claim is because of the benefits of having a 
federal forum to adjudicate an important federal issue. 
B.  Erie Step Zero and Affidavits of Merit 
Many states require that an affidavit of merit be filed contemporaneously 
with a complaint or shortly after a complaint has been filed when a claim 
relates to medical malpractice.221  Most courts have concluded that these 
requirements are substantive for Erie purposes and therefore have applied 
them in diversity cases.222  Yet courts have not required that an affidavit be 
filed to support a claim based on federal law that involves deficient medical 
care, such as an Eighth Amendment violation for deliberate indifference.223  
Where state law claims for deliberate indifference are joined to a federal 
question claim, my proposed framework provides a simple solution:  an 
affidavit of merit may be required under state law to pursue the state law 
claim but not to pursue a claim based in federal law.  Even though many 
state’s affidavits of merit define the cases to which the rule applies broadly 
enough to encompass constitutional claims for deliberate indifference,224 
applying the state law across the board would significantly interfere with 
federal interests. 
C.  Erie Step Zero and Cost Shifting 
Several courts have held, in the supplemental jurisdiction context, that the 
Erie doctrine requires that state law govern awards of attorney’s fees in cases 
 
claim, based both on interpretation of Rule 501 and principles of uniformity); In re 
Combustion, Inc., 161 F.R.D. 51, 53–54 (W.D. La.), aff’d, 161 F.R.D. 54 (W.D. La. 1995) 
(finding that federal law applied across the board in part because the relevant federal statutes 
both provided for exclusive jurisdiction). 
 220. See supra note 108. 
 221. See Meryl J. Thomas, Note, The Merits of Procedure vs. Substance:  Erie, Iqbal, and 
Affidavits of Merit as MedMal Reform, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 1135, 1139 (2010) (surveying state 
statutes and reporting that more than a third of states have adopted this requirement). 
 222. See, e.g., Larca v. United States, 302 F.R.D. 148, 158 (N.D. Ohio 2014) (collecting 
authorities). 
 223. See, e.g., Jackson v. Grondolsky, No. 09-5617 (NLH/KMW), 2012 WL 960450, 
at *13 (D.N.J. Mar. 20, 2012); Doe v. City of Chicago, 883 F. Supp. 1126, 1134 (N.D. Ill. 
1994). 
 224. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.113 (West 2015). 
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where a judgment is based on both federal and state claims.225  The 
framework I propose here would raise questions about this approach.  For it 
is well recognized that, in areas such as Title VII, for instance, fee- and cost-
shifting provisions are part and parcel of effective enforcement of the 
statutory regime.226  Thus, if applying state fee-shifting rules to federal law 
claims undermined those substantive goals, it may be inappropriate to do so.  
It may be that in cases that have common facts, costs and fees attributable to 
a state law claim are indistinguishable from those attributable to a federal law 
claim.  But if that is the case, one still needs a valid reason to choose state 
law over federal law to govern cost shifting. 
D.  The Boundaries of Erie Step Zero 
There are other examples in which Erie Step Zero might apply, such as 
commencement of an action for statute of limitations purposes,227 the 
availability of remedies such as an anti-SLAPP motion,228 application of 
forum non conveniens doctrine,229 or the impact of settlement releases and 
assignability of interests.230  Consider the dispute at issue in Town of Newton 
v. Rumery231:  there the Court addressed whether a release-dismissal 
agreement purporting to bar a person from filing a civil rights action in return 
for a prosecutor’s dismissal of pending criminal charges was invalid as 
against public policy.  The Court rejected the First Circuit’s per se rule 
invalidating such agreements and held that the bar should apply in that case 
because the would-be plaintiff had voluntarily entered into the agreement, 
there was no evidence of prosecutorial misconduct in obtaining the 
agreement, and no indication that enforcement of the agreement would 
 
 225. See supra note 211. 
 226. See, e.g., SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE:  PUBLIC REGULATION AND PRIVATE 
LAWSUITS IN THE U.S. 4, 62 (2010); Margaret H. Lemos, Special Incentives to Sue, 95 MINN. 
L. REV. 782, 793–94 (2011); cf. Chambers v. Nasco, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 55–56 (1991) 
(concluding that the district court acted within its discretion in a diversity case by invoking its 
inherent power and assessing attorney’s fees and expenses as a sanction for a party’s bad faith 
litigation conduct, and rejecting an Erie challenge to the district court’s action). 
 227. Although state law governs commencement in diversity cases, see Walker v. Armco 
Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 753 (1980), federal law governs commencement in federal question 
cases, see West v. Conrail, 481 U.S. 35, 39 n.4 (1987).  While it may be possible to apply state 
and federal law simultaneously in some supplemental jurisdiction cases, a court would have 
to make a choice in those cases in which § 1331 jurisdiction is asserted over a state law cause 
of action. 
 228. Globetrotter Software, Inc. v. Elan Comput. Grp., Inc., 63 F. Supp. 2d 1127, 1129–30 
(N.D. Cal. 1999) (applying anti-SLAPP law to state law claims asserted pendent to federal 
question claims but not to federal question claims). 
 229. The Supreme Court has, for instance, declined to decide whether forum non 
conveniens analysis is a matter of state or federal law in diversity cases. See Piper Aircraft Co. 
v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 248 n.13 (1981).  But it has at least implied that it should be considered 
procedural even if state courts might displace federal forum non conveniens law in admiralty 
and other cases. See Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 454 & n.4 (1994). 
 230. Caleb Nelson, The Persistence of General Law, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 528–31 
(2006) (arguing that “general law,” labeled as federal common law, is operative in cases 
implicating interstate disputes, rights and obligations of the national government, customary 
international law, and maritime law). 
 231. 480 U.S. 386 (1987). 
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“adversely affect the relevant public interests.”232  The Court, however, left 
open the question of whether such agreements might be unenforceable in 
other cases.233  And in a case like Rumery itself, in which the plaintiff had 
brought § 1983 and pendent state law claims, a difficult question could arise 
if we assume that state law would apply to the state law claims and federal 
law—invalidating the agreement—would apply to the § 1983 claims.234 
Nonetheless, there will be limits to our willingness to permit federal court 
to displace state law in the examples I have provided.  For instance, mere 
recourse to the argument that uniformity is better when federal law is 
involved should not typically be enough, absent a showing of how 
disuniformity would interfere with the effective operation of federal law.235  
And when we examine the potential for conflict between federal and state 
interests, we might look for more than inconsistency and instead look for a 
more direct clash.236  We might also be concerned if applying federal law 
would “preclude[] the execution of state laws by state authority in a matter 
normally within state power.”237  Balancing of state and federal interests will 
almost always be central to the inquiry.238 
 
 232. Id. at 397–98. 
 233. Id. at 398 & n.10; see, e.g., Vallone v. Lee, 7 F.3d 196, 198 (11th Cir. 1993) 
(distinguishing Rumery because the plaintiff presented evidence that he had been coerced into 
signing the agreement); see also Livingstone v. North Belle Vernon Borough, 12 F.3d 1205, 
1210 (3d Cir. 1993) (distinguishing Rumery on voluntariness and public interest grounds). 
 234. In Livingstone, the court assumed, in the absence of briefing, that state contract law 
would govern the state law claims but concluded that the outcome would be the same under 
both federal and state law. See Livingstone 12 F.3d at 1209 n.6.  In a Northern District of Ohio 
case, the parties did not address a similar question, and the court made no assumption about 
which law would apply to the state law claims. See Kinney v. City of Cleveland, 144 F. Supp. 
2d 908, 910 n.1 (N.D. Ohio 2001).  A court in the District of Puerto Rico appears to have 
assumed that its analysis of waiver law for the purposes of § 1983 was sufficient to permit 
supplemental jurisdiction claims to go forward as well. Valle Colon v. Municipality of 
Maricao, No. 09-02217(PG), 2011 WL 1238437, at *13 (D.P.R. Mar. 23, 2011).  And a 
Northern District of Oklahoma court relied on the potential merit and value of the plaintiff’s 
federal and supplemental state law claims to distinguish Rumery and invalidate the waiver as 
applied to all claims. See Spradlin v. City of Owasso, No. 12-CV-497-JED-FHM, 2014 WL 
1664974, at *4 (N.D. Okla. Apr. 25, 2014). 
 235. Helen Hershkoff, Shady Grove:  Duck-Rabbits, Clear Statements, and Federalism, 74 
ALB. L. REV. 1703, 1720–22 (2011) (criticizing the Court’s implicit “clear statement” rule 
applied in Shady Grove and proposing alternative approaches to balancing federal interest in 
uniformity against “important state substantive concerns”); Theresa C. O’Loughlin, Adopting 
State Law as the Federal Rule of Decision:  A Proposed Test, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 840–41 
(1976) (proposing that courts should look at whether a lack of uniformity would interfere with 
“the functioning of a specific federal program” by making it administratively impracticable or 
if disuniformity would conflict with the federal program). 
 236. O’Loughlin, supra note 235, at 838 (arguing that federal law should control if state 
law operates as “a direct negation of particular purposes of the federal program”; otherwise, 
courts should balance federal and state interests). 
 237. Davies Warehouse Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 144, 155 (1944) (declining to use a 
uniform federal rule in a rate regulation case). 
 238. Kaminsky, supra note 109, at 939 (arguing that federal courts should balance the 
particular federal interests involved in a given case against the rationale of the relevant state 
evidentiary privilege when deciding which privilege law to apply in federal question 
litigation); O’Loughlin, supra note 235, at 829–30. 
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At the same time, however, it should be clear that my proposal does not 
necessarily run afoul of federalism concerns.  Even in diversity cases, the 
Court has recognized that federal common law can displace state law.239  
There also is federal power to displace state law to the extent it is necessary 
to make the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction more effective.  Take 
Justice Antonin Scalia’s opinion for the Court in Jinks v. Richland County.240  
In that case, a South Carolina county argued that 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d), which 
tolls the statute of limitations for state law claims brought initially in federal 
court over which a district court declines to exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction, was unconstitutional because it displaced a state statute of 
limitations.241  The Supreme Court held that § 1367(d) was within Congress’s 
power, despite the fact that it affected a right that was “substantive” within 
the meaning of Erie, for two reasons:  (1) it “promotes fair and efficient 
operation of the federal courts and is therefore conducive to the 
administration of justice” and (2) “it eliminates a serious impediment to 
access to the federal courts on the part of plaintiffs pursuing federal- and 
state-law claims that ‘derive from a common nucleus of operative fact.’”242  
My proposal here takes the intuitions from Jinks and suggests that that power 
could be exercised, through the RDA, in federal question cases. 
This reasoning, of course, does not eliminate the separation of powers 
problem implicitly raised by Erie and its progeny when judges stray further 
from the explicit dictates of a statute or from the dictates of the Rules 
Enabling Act.243  There are forceful arguments against an expansive judicial 
role in creating federal common law, particularly when state sovereignty is 
threatened as a result.  And this approach to Erie questions has had impact 
beyond traditional choice-of-law conflicts.  The view that Erie compels 
application of state law in federal question cases has undoubtedly contributed 
to the general skepticism of federal court lawmaking power even outside of 
traditional Erie conflicts.  Thus, whether it be filling gaps in a statutory 
framework in federal question cases,244 inferring a damages remedy from the 
 
 239. See supra notes 58–67. 
 240. 538 U.S. 456 (2003). 
 241. The petitioner in Jinks initially filed a § 1983 claim in federal court with supplemental 
state law claims. Id. at 460.  The district court granted summary judgment on the § 1983 claims 
and declined to exercise jurisdiction over the state law claims. Id.  Petitioner refiled in state 
court but had her jury verdict reversed by the South Carolina Supreme Court, which reasoned 
that § 1367(d) could not toll South Carolina’s statute of limitations, because it interfered with 
the state’s sovereignty. Id. 
 242. Id. at 462–63 (quoting United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966)). 
 243. Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1106 
(1982) (“Nothing could be clearer from the pre-1934 history of the Rules Enabling Act that 
the procedure/substance dichotomy . . . was intended to allocate lawmaking power between 
the Supreme Court as rulemaker and Congress.”); see also Stephen B. Burbank, 
Interjurisdictional Preclusion, Full Faith and Credit and Federal Common Law:  A General 
Approach, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 733, 757–59 (1986) [hereinafter Burbank, Interjurisdictional 
Preclusion]. 
 244. See Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., 500 U.S. 90, 98 (1991) (“Our cases indicate that a 
court should endeavor to fill the interstices of federal remedial schemes with uniform federal 
rules only when the scheme in question evidences a distinct need for nationwide legal 
standards or when express provisions in analogous statutory schemes embody congressional 
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Constitution,245 or implying a private right of action from a federal statute,246 
federal courts are increasingly hesitant to exercise what might be associated 
with the common-law-making power exercised in the pre-Erie period.247 
Despite the force of these arguments, substantial criticism has been levied 
against the argument that any lawmaking power exercised by the federal 
courts is inconsistent with separation of powers principles.248  And even 
scholars who argue for an extremely formal and limited role for federal 
common law—stemming from a principle such as “judicial federalism”—
acknowledge that the RDA’s “require or provide” language is broad enough 
to tolerate some federal common law.249  Or, as Professor Steve Burbank put 
 
policy choices readily applicable to the matter at hand.  Otherwise, we have indicated that 
federal courts should ‘incorporat[e] [state law] as the federal rule of decision,’ unless 
‘application of [the particular] state law [in question] would frustrate specific objectives of the 
federal programs.’” (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (quoting United States v. 
Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728 (1979))); see also Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. 
v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 615 (1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (tracing the Erie 
doctrine to reluctance to fill in gaps); Mark J. Loewenstein, Implied Contribution Under the 
Federal Securities Laws:  A Reassessment, 1982 DUKE L.J. 543, 573 n.156 (acknowledging 
that state law might inform the law of contribution in federal securities law cases, even if Erie 
does not apply, because federal courts may still look to state law for the rule of decision when 
the federal statute is silent); Mark Moller, The Checks and Balances of Forum Shopping, 1 
STAN. J. COMPLEX LITIG. 107, 142 (2012) (noting that the Court has relied on Erie to cast doubt 
on federal courts’ power to fill in interstices in federal question cases, “unless federal courts’ 
authority to do so is clearly contemplated by a federal statutory scheme”). But see Lind, supra 
note 26, at 285–86 & nn.146–51 (citing examples of federal question cases in which courts 
declined to adopt state law comparability review of damages awards because of a conflict with 
federal common law). 
 245. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 39 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (analogizing the 
jurisprudence of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 
388 (1971), to federal common-law-making power “repudiated” by Erie); Berzon, supra note 
196, at 703–04 (arguing that the conflation of Bivens jurisprudence with pre-Erie federal 
common law misreads Erie because when enforcing the Constitution or federal statutes, there 
is no need to worry over whether “litigants with similar claims in state courts may receive 
substantively different outcomes than those in federal court”). 
 246. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 726 (2004) (linking Erie to a “significant 
rethinking” of the role federal courts play in implying private rights of action); id. at 730–31 
n.19 (suggesting that “more expansive common law power related to 28 U.S.C. § 1331” might 
be inconsistent with Erie); Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 742 (1979) (Powell, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that Erie compels the abandonment of the implied right of action doctrine 
of Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975)); Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 651 (1963) (“As 
respects the creation by the federal courts of common-law rights, it is perhaps needless to state 
that we are not in the free-wheeling days antedating Erie.”). 
 247. Looking just at Bivens jurisprudence, for example, the Supreme Court has refused 
since 1980 to recognize any new Bivens cause of action. See generally Alexander A. Reinert 
& Lumen N. Mulligan, Asking the First Question:  Reframing Bivens After Minneci, 90 WASH. 
U. L. REV. 1473 (2013). 
 248. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1479, 1498–502 (1987) (“[T]he structure of the Constitution, the apparent expectations 
of the Framers, and two hundred years of Supreme Court practice establish the authority of 
federal courts to make law, subject to legislative override.”). 
 249. Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1, 31–32 (1985) (“A more cautious conclusion would be that the Rules of Decision Act is at 
least consistent with what is conventionally thought of as ‘interpretation’—enforcing the 
intentions of the draftsmen of the text.”).  For Merrill, however, judicial displacement of state 
law by federal common law is only appropriate when “inability to impose a federal common 
law rule could frustrate specifically intended federal policies.” Id. at 34.  Merrill identifies 
2017] ERIE STEP ZERO 2383 
it slightly differently, “If the Constitution or acts of Congress, fairly read, 
provide for or require federal common law, state law does not apply” within 
the meaning of the RDA.250  In that sense, the proposal I present here could 
be viewed as one method for determining when federal law requires or 
provides for federal common law. 
CONCLUSION 
For too long, courts and commentators have assumed that Erie analysis 
applies to RDA problems in nondiversity cases without fully elaborating on 
what that means.  My goal in this Article is to show that we need a different 
framework for addressing RDA problems in federal question cases, one that 
takes some of the broad insights from Erie and its progeny but translates them 
across jurisdictional lines.  Erie Step Zero provides this structure, focusing 
on the specific forum shopping, inequity, and balancing concerns that can be 
implicated outside of the diversity context so as to ensure that courts do not 
reflexively displace federal law in any case in which a state law claim is 
presented.  Although my proposed framework may not result in radically 
different outcomes in federal question cases, I hope that it provides a better 
guide to decision making. 
 
 
three specific instances in which this circumstance might justify the assertion of common-law-
making power:  first, and easiest to square with the RDA, are those situations in which 
statutory interpretation based on the specific intentions of the drafters provides the applicable 
federal rule; second is where a uniform federal rule is “necessary . . . to preserve or effectuate 
some other federal policy that can be derived” from the drafters’ intentions; and third is where 
the drafters’ intentions provide evidence that federal courts have been given “reasonably 
circumscribed” lawmaking power. Id. at 47. 
 250. Burbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, supra note 243, at 757–59, 762. 
